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I. INTRODUCTION
One of Aristotle's concerns in the Nicomachean Ethics (Ethics) is to
explain his theory of how people acquire virtue.' He states that "one becomes
just by doing just acts and moderate by doing moderate acts."2 Those who
merely "take refuge in discussing virtue think that they are pursuing
*
Associate Librarian and Lecturer in Law, Indiana University School of law,
Bloomington, Indiana.
I The author has consulted both ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcs (Terence
Irwin trans., Hackett 1985) [hereinafter Irwin], and ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics (H.
Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1926) [herinafter Rackham]. However, all translations of
the Ethics in this work are by the author, based on the standard Greek text contained in the
Rackham edition. For the purpose of citation to the Greek, the author has provided the Bekker
numbers, which is the standard form for citing Aristotle's Greek texts.
2
1105b9-11.
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philosophy and will become good, just like the sick, who listen attentively to
their doctors, but ignore their prescriptions." The latter will never have
healthy bodies, and the former will never have healthy souls.
As one may infer from these passages, Aristotle takes the position
that action is central both to the acquisition and (by extension) to the exercise
of virtue. The healthy soul (psyche) is somehow an active soul. Therefore,
the Ethics seeks to explain the nature and source of virtuous action, or what I
shall call the mechanics of virtue. The core of these mechanics is composed
of the elements that drive moral choice, namely disposition and practical
reason. However, the forces that shape these elements are also very
important. Therefore, as we shall see, the mechanics of virtue also
comprehend Aristotle's theories of moral education and friendship. Finally,
shaping these theories is Aristotle's view of moral principle as something
normative, yet, at the same time, proximate and subject to contextual
variation. This view, in turn, is shaped by Aristotle's initial insight that moral
goodness inheres in specific actions, rather than in knowledge of
transcendent universal truths.
Part II of this essay outlines the mechanics of virtue and seeks to
extract from it a normative theory of political virtue, which is simply one
form of virtue in general. Specifically, it attempts to demonstrate that the
establishment of binding general rules of conduct, i.e., laws, for members of
the polis requires consensual choice-making by its members. This theory
follows from three primary considerations. First, human flourishing requires
virtue. Because virtue is a matter of deliberate choice and action, rather than
pure thought, human flourishing requires such choice and action. Therefore,
to the extent that virtue involves, as a form of activity, the codification of
general principles of conduct, members of the polis must contribute to the
process of codification in order to flourish with respect to that aspect of
virtue. Second, because the achievement of virtue in deliberation and choicemaking in general requires extensive, even life-long practice, political virtue
also requires such practice in the form of political participation. Third,
because the insights of even the most virtuous are limited by the narrow
scope of an individual human being's experience, the best political choice
requires the pooling of insights through a consensual process.
It is important to note that the theory of political virtue offered is
neo-Aristotelean; Aristotle himself did not endorse democracy in the Ethics,
nor does the Ethics concern itself much with political life per se, as we would
understand that term. In part, the theory of political virtue offered here
depends upon an understanding of moral education that is far greater in
scope than the straight-forward relationship between teacher and student
presented by Aristotle in his brief remarks on the subject. Ultimately, it
views the scope of moral agency and moral training as co-terminus.
However, this essay does assert that the theory of political virtue upon which
3
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it depends is implicit in the Ethics. It may be inferred without
misappropriating or misconstruing the spirit of Aristotle's argument. In short,
it recontextualizes Aristotle's Ethics in order to address concerns to which a
modern sensibility is susceptible, but which did not concern Aristotle
himself.4
Part III of this essay applies the theory of political virtue, and its
requirement of consensual decision-making, to make a normative argument
against the practice of strong judicial review (hereinafter judicial review,
unless specifically contrasted with weak forms of judicial review).
Obviously, the primary example of strong judicial review, and this
argument's target, is that practiced in the United States. From the point of
view of this theory, judicial review is problematic for several reasons. By
referring the articulation of binding general principles of conduct to the
judiciary, judicial review isolates the members of the polis from sufficient
engagement in a process, which is necessary for their moral development and
self-actualization. Moreover, to the extent that it fails to incorporate the
widest possible array of virtuous perspectives, judicial review leads to
4
Investigation of the precise relationship between the neo-Aristotelean theory of
political virtue and the views of Aristotle himself is a historical matter that lies outside the
scope of this essay. In the Politics, Aristotle endorses a mixed constitution under which
government is divided between the many and the best. If judges exercising judicial review are
analogous to the best, then it may turn out that judicial review is compatible with Aristotle's
most developed views on government. In that case, the neo-Aristotelean theory of political
virtue will have to simply set aside those views (much as one must, to some degree, set aside
Book Ten in order to extract an internally consistent set of views from the Ethics) or assert
that they do not in fact follow from the Ethics (as interpreted here) and are therefore
irrelevant. Alternatively, it may prove to be the case that apparent inconsistency between the
Ethics (as interpreted here) and the Politics dissolves in light of some persuasive argument
that the many and the best are not separate groups. Should such an argument hold up, then
judges exercising judicial review obviously cannot be analogous to the best, since they are not
analogous to the many. In that case, the theory of political virtue will turn out to be more
Aristotelean and less neo-Aristotelean. The point here is only that: (1) the theory of political
virtue is consistent with Aristotle's claim in the Ethics that the purpose of the polis is to
promote and maintain the moral virtue of its citizens; (2) the implication of this theory, i.e.,
consensual decision-making, is not inconsistent with the Ethics more generally; and (3) the
theory is, in fact, implicit in Aristotle's concepts of moral education and friendship.
s
For present purposes, strong judicial review may be defined generally as the
process through which courts are empowered to set aside a legislative enactment on the
ground that it violates a more fundamental constitutional norm. By legislative enactment it is
meant a statute duly enacted by a democratically elected body. It does not include
administrative regulations set aside as ultra vires under the terms of the statute empowering a
subordinate agency to adopt them. By court it is meant any judicial body not directly
accountable to the citizenry through elections, and whose decisions are not directly reviewable
by a democratically elected body. The term would therefore include such bodies as the French
Cour Constitutionnel,although that body is not a court of law. Under this general definition,
fundamental norms need not be embodied in a written constitution, nor must judicial review
necessarily be exercised after the fact in a case or controversy. The critical attribute of strong
judicial review is that it involves a process through which enactments of a democratically
chosen legislature are subject to annulment through the action of an appointed body applying
fundamental, constitutional norms.
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principles that are less likely to be satisfactory than they would be if forged
in the crucible of consensual politics.
The bulk of Part II attempts to determine the nature and depth of the
apparent incompatibility between the neo-Aristotelean theory of political
virtue and judicial review. It does so by comparing the theory of political
virtue with two theories of democracy that assert the opposite, i.e., that
judicial review is compatible with democracy and, therefore, with the
requirement of consensual decision-making. In concluding that the neoAristotelean theory is incompatible with either of these theories, the essay
demonstrates that the ethical concerns underlying the neo-Aristotelean theory
are indeed likely to be incompatible with any theory of strong judicial
review.
Two threshold objections might be interposed to this entire project.
First, one might object that the proposed argument places too high a value on
political activity in the acquisition of virtue. Why, one might ask, must
members of the polis develop virtue specifically with respect to political
choice-making, rather than with respect to some other field(s) of activity?
Does Aristotle insist that human flourishing depends upon achievement of
complete virtue in every realm of human activity? Is the acquisition of such
complete virtue even possible within the limits of a single human life?
Couldn't an individual quite reasonably choose to develop his or her
expertise as a guitarist instead of spending precious time participating in
politics? All of these questions point to the rejoinder that members of the
polis enjoy quite sufficient opportunity to develop virtue, without worrying
about their exclusion, through judicial review, from participation in the
solution of a sub-set of political problems referred to courts.
One response to this first objection is to assert that it hits wide of the
mark. One could claim that the argument presented here is not a general one
that judicial review precludes the development and exercise of virtue tout
court,but that it does so only by those who wish to participate in the solution
of what are now constitutional problems rather than spend time becoming
guitarists. On the assumption that there are many such individuals, judicial
review does in fact present a problem from the neo-Aristotelean standpoint
because it prevents those individuals from acting as responsible agents in the
solution of "constitutionalized" problems.
This response is sound, and the fact that many political
constituencies self-evidently are interested in constitutional questions is
significant. But this response nevertheless leaves the argument presented
here in a somewhat weakened state because the argument can only be
deployed on behalf of a subset of citizens, even if that subset is large. A
better response, one that is anchored within the Ethics, is to rely upon the
peculiar importance Aristotle assigns to political science in promoting virtue.
As we shall see, Aristotle believes that people are by nature political beings.
By this he means that they seek the good life (insofar as the good life is not
equated with pure contemplation) in the highest and most generalized sense,
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in the context of association with others. Therefore, politics is the master
science of the supreme good because politics orders the community of the
polis and thereby establishes the norms that shape people's lives most
comprehensively. As a result, all people have, or should have, a special
interest in politics. 6
One might still object that political participation is possible for
members of the polis without limiting the scope of judicial review. After all,
most questions of public policy are still determined in the United States by
the political branches of national, state, and local government and, in other
democracies, by analogous representative bodies. Many such questions are of
profound significance, affording ample opportunity to the citizens of the
polis to engage in significant political action. The response to this objection
must be that constitutional questions relating to human rights, for example,
the nature and extent of due equality in a pluralist and cosmopolitan
democracy, the proper scope of privacy, the appropriate balance between
security and freedom, and the nature and limits of free speech, are of
overwhelming moral and political significance. Therefore, while it is
important that citizens be afforded an opportunity to act on questions such as
the location and financing of local parks and the merits of all-day
kindergarten, such activity is no substitute for the opportunity to take
politically decisive action on questions of deeper significance. Aristotle's
conception of political science as the master science of the good recognizes
the connection between politics and the working out of such questions.
Although there may be individuals (such as the single-minded guitarist) who
are agnostic concerning politics, Aristotle nevertheless asserts that human
beings ought to develop their most comprehensive conception of what it
means to lead a good life within the context of political life.
The second threshold objection is more in the nature of a question, or
request for further explanation. At first blush, it might reasonably seem
unpromising to rely upon Aristotle for a critique of contemporary judicial
review. In more general terms, one might ask: why rely on virtue ethics,
rather than upon a consequentialist or deontological argument? The short
6
Martha Nussbaum agrees that the achievement of human flourishing requires
political participation. She states that "an essential element in the complete good life is
political activity." Martha Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in LIBERALISM AND THE
GOOD 203, 243 (R. Bruce Douglass, Gerald M. Mara & Henry S. Richardson eds., 1990)
[hereinafter Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy]. This follows from the fact that
"planning the conception of the good that shapes a citizen's life is a job that goes on, in part,
in the political sphere." Id. at 233. Therefore, "good functioning in accordance with practical
reason requires that every citizen should have the opportunity to make choices concerning this
plan." Id. Like the argument above, this argument emphasizes the instrumental value of
political participation in shaping the contours of community life, and the important influence
community life has upon its members' lives. Nussbaum also asserts that there are two kinds of
sociability involved in "fully good human functioning," namely "close personal relationships .
. . and also relationships of a political kind . . . ." Id. This argument correctly emphasizes the
virtuous nature of political participation as an end in itself, rather than its instrumental value in
ordering other aspects of life.
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answer is that Aristotle, and virtue ethics in general, have not been applied in
this way, and it is worth determining whether they have anything important
to say on the subject.7 A longer, related answer is that it would perhaps be
particularly persuasive if all three approaches-consequentialist,
deontological, and virtue-based--could be deployed successfully to reach the
same conclusion. As we shall see, strong consequentialist and deontological
cases have in fact been made, if not directly against judicial review, then in
favor of legislative determination of moral-political questions. Therefore, it
remains to show that virtue ethics, in particular, can be used to reach this
same conclusion. Finally, the fully developed virtue-based argument is
uniquely appealing, at least when based upon Aristotle. This is especially
clear in comparison to the deontological case for moral legislation. 9
7
Miriam Galston has considered the relevance of Aristotele's concept of
character (and character formation) to the functioning of deliberative democracy, but not the
relevance of deliberative democracy to judicial review. See generally Miriam Galston, Taking
Aristotle Seriously: Republican-Oriented Legal Theory and the Moral Foundation of
DeliberativeDemocracy, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 329 (1994).
9
The consequentialist argument has been made by many, including Robert Dahl.
ROBERT DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989) [hereinafter DAHL, DEMOCRACY]. The
deontological argument has been made by Jirgen Habermas. E.g., JORGEN HABERMAS,

BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND

(William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996).
The deontological approach is represented by Jirgen Habermas's discourse
theory, which asserts that social cooperation depends upon the intersubjective validity of
various sorts of claims, such as truth claims about the natural world, rightness claims about
moral propositions, technical claims about effective means, etc. The task of discourse theory
in general is to analyze the argumentative practices and presuppositions characteristic of each
type of validity claim. Such practices include notions of logical sufficiency (which, in
Habermas's view, usually depends on, inter alia, induction, analogy, and narrative, rather than
deductive certainty), dialectical obligations (meaning criteria of sufficient proof), and
pragmatic presuppositions about "what it would mean to assess all the relevant information
and arguments . . . as reasonably as possible, weighing arguments purely on the merits in a
disinterested pursuit of truth." James Bohman & William Rehg, Jilrgen Habermas, in STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
PHILOSOPHY
(Edward
N.
Zalta
ed.,
Summer
2007),
Such presuppositions are
http://plato.stanford.edularchives/sum2007/entries/habermas.
counterfactual in the sense that "actual discourses can rarely realize-and can never
empirically certify-full inclusion, non-coercion, and equality." Id. Thus, they represent a
highly idealized form of communication, or "ideal speech situation." Id. Habermas
summarizes his discourse theory for all questions involving the application of practical reason
in a discourse principle that can be stated as follows: "A rule of action or choice is justified,
and thus valid, only if all those affected by the rule or choice could accept it in a reasonable
discourse." Id. Habermas's neo-Kantianism is most evident in the application of this principle
to the realm of moral discourse. "Like Kant, he considers morality a matter of unconditional
DEMOCRACY
9

moral obligations .

. .

. The task of moral theory is to reconstruct the unconditional force of

such obligations as impartial dictates of practical reason that hold for any similarly situated
agent." Id. Thus, moral discourse rests upon the pragmatic presumption of universal
consensus, i.e., "in making a . . . rightness claim one counterfactually presupposes that a
universal consensus would result, were the participants able to pursue a sufficiently inclusive
and reasonable discourse for a sufficient length of time." Id. Given Habermas's view that
moral validity claims must be established dialogically, as a function of discourse, rather than
by logical deduction (as a pure Kantian would suppose), the discourse principle can be further
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specified, in the context of moral discourse, as a dialogical principle of universalization: "A
[moral norm] is valid just in case the foreseeable consequences and side-effects of its general
observance for the interests and value-orientations of each individual could be jointly accepted
by all concerned without coercion (i.e., in a sufficiently reasonable discourse)." Bohman &
Rehg, supra (alteration in orginal) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Habermas's principle of universalization thus depends upon a highly counterfactual, and
therefore highly idealized, form of consensus. The "ideal warranted assertability" of a moral
norm, i.e. its rightness, depends upon its validity "in a fully inclusive and reasonable
discourse." Id.
Habermas's theory of legal and political discourse is closely related to his theory of
moral discourse, but distinctively shaped by two additional factors. First, it responds to the
"conflict potentials inherent in modernization." Id. Law is valid only if it secures private
autonomy and thereby "reduces the burden of questions that require general (society-wide)
discursive consensus." Id. Second, it must recognize that law-making involves a combination
of validity claims, such as technical claims about means, truth claims about the likely
consequences of following various policy options, and rightness claims about the purposes of
policies themselves. As a result, laws are valid only if they pass the discursive tests
characteristic of all validity claims supporting them.
Both of these factors lead to the following democratic discourse principle for the
domain of political-legal validity claims: "[O]nly those statutes may claim legitimacy that can
meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been
legally constituted." Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). This principle is
consistent with, even required by, the constraints of modernization because private autonomy
rights are expressions of freedom (a precondition of voluntary assent) only if citizens are
authors of the laws that guarantee and interpret the scope of those rights, "that is, only if the
laws that protect private autonomy also issue from citizens' exercise of public autonomy as
lawmakers acting through elected representatives." Id. "The idea of public autonomy means
that the legitimacy of ordinary legislation must ultimately be traceable to robust processes of
public discourse that influence formal decisionmaking in legislative bodies." Bohman &
Rehg, supra. The principal of democracy follows also from the requirement of multi-faceted
discursive validation because such validation leads to the need for an institutional framework
capable of working out and reconciling the complex set of discursive practices underlying the
process of lawmaking. Legislative bodies embody sufficiently inclusive deliberative processes
of "opinion- and will-formation" to permit "something like a warranted presumption of
reasonableness." Id. (citation omitted).
The democratic discourse principle parallels the concerns and conclusions of the
neo-Aristotelean argument, presented here, in its recognition of legislation as the institutional
framework best suited to reconciling complex discursive practices. Moreover, Habermas
believes that private and public autonomy are purely abstract rights generated by the
functional requirements of law in modern states, and that "each polity must further interpret
and flesh them out for its particular historical circumstances . . . ." Id. Thus, the democratic
discourse principle seems to depend upon at least some of the contextual particularity that
plays such an important role in Aristotle's mechanics of virtue.
But as a component of discourse theory, the democratic principle presumably
specifies the principle of validation for claims made in a particular kind of practical discourse,
i.e., political-legal discourse. In other words, its purpose is to settle disputes over the cognitive
validity of competing claims within the context of that particular discourse. Like the principle
of universalization in moral discourse, it operates under a highly idealized presumption of
consensus, driven by the unconditionality of obligations issued as commands by impartial
reason. Thus, "reasonable political discourse must at least begin with the supposition that legal
questions admit in principle of single right answers" acceptable to the entire affected
community. Id. This follows not only from the analogous function of the democratic discourse
principle and the principle of universalization within moral discourse theory, but from the
inevitable fact that many political-legal questions involve moral discourse directly. Thus, the
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II.
A. Introduction
The purpose of Part I is not to present a systematic exposition of
Aristotle's ethical views, but to focus on those aspects that lay a foundation
for the neo-Aristotelean theory of political virtue. It begins with an
introduction to Aristotle's core concept of the supreme good.'o This will lead
in subsequent sections to consideration of Aristotle's concepts of moral
education, deliberation, and friendship. Each of these sections discusses, in
turn, certain problems in these concepts, which are resolved through a
notion of warranted reasonableness conceals the fact that such reasonableness often must
include the idealized universal consensus of moral discourse.
The deontological character of practical discourse theory is difficult to square with
the notion that cultural, and even compositely evaluated individual particularity, must
influence the content of laws actually adopted as general rules of conduct. It stands in contrast
to the neo-Aristotelean emphasis on the approximate, conditional, and possibly non-exclusive
character of general norms of conduct. The more one accepts the variety of human experience,
the more idealized, and therefore less satisfactory, the presupposition of universal consensus
becomes.
Habermas might reply that if democratic deliberation results in multiple valid
conceptions of correct laws, then the political community in question must simply consign the
matter to the sphere of private autonomy. After all, if political-legal deliberation differs
categorically in any way from moral deliberation, it must be in its capacity to make pragmatic
adjustments to the demands of modernity. But there are two problems with this response. First,
it is impossible to eliminate moral conflict from the political-legal realm in this way for the
simple reason that such conflict does not always involve questions of individual behavior. For
example, issues involving allocation of resources rather than regulation of personal conduct
cannot just be consigned to the private sphere, even when they engender deep moral conflict.
Second, the notion that irreconcilable conflict necessarily (i.e., as a condition of political
legitimacy) remains outside the democratic process, combined with the stipulation that
modernity engenders conflict (and perhaps is locked into a trajectory of ever increasing
conflict), leads inexorably to the conclusion that public autonomy is constrained (and perhaps
will eventually disappear altogether), at least with respect to decisionmaking that involves
moral discourse. But if public autonomy is a vital prerequisite to private autonomy (the two are
"co-original" or "equiprimordial"), the effective curtailment or disappearance of public
autonomy will also lead to the curtailment or disappearance of private autonomy, and therefore
to the possibility of voluntary assent that underlies discourse theory. Id.
This latter conclusion helps to reveal another problem with, or limitation in,
Habermas's deontological approach, namely that it tends to view political participation
instrumentally. If the democratic discourse principle yields multiple contested valid conceptions
of what is right or good in a given case of legal-political deliberation, that must be counted as
something of a political failure since that result fails to meet the pragmatic goal of universal
assent and, therefore, decreases the effective scope of public autonomy. But in Aristotle's
virtue-based ethics, excellent political participation is itself a form of virtuous activity, and
therefore an end in itself; persistent disagreement is not necessarily a failure, as long as the
virtue of political friendship permits citizens to continue to cooperate in the effort to identify
desirable policy. In sum, Aristotle's virtue-based analysis of the good, with its focus at least as
much on the process of decisionmaking as on the specific decisions made, provides both a
better justification of democracy, and a better explanation of its continuing value, even in the
face of persistent failure to achieve agreement.
10 See infra Part II.B.
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consideration of their relationship to the broader concept of the supreme
good. Solution of these problems then leads in the final section to the theory
of political virtue and the normative argument for consensual political
decision-making.
B. The Supreme Good
Aristotle conceives ethics as an investigation into the nature of the
best life available to human beings and the means of achieving it. In Book
One, he makes three basic claims about living well, which together place the
Ethics within a teleological framework: (1) he claims that the supreme
human good is happiness (eudaimonia);" (2) he claims that eudaimonia is an
activity of the soul in conformity with the soul's own proper excellence or
virtue (kat' aretein);12 and (3) he claims that eudaimonia, thus defined,
constitutes the proper excellence of mankind.13 To achieve this excellence in
activity of the soul is to perform one's function as a human being well, thus
to be virtuous, and therefore eudaimon.
Aristotle begins Book One with the concept of a hierarchy of goods,
the apex of which is the supreme good, at which all actions aim.14 The formal
criteria of the supreme good are (1) that it is the final, "unconditional end" of
all action, meaning that it is "chosen always for its own sake and never for
the sake of something else"" and (2) that it is self-sufficient, meaning that6
which "by. itself makes life choiceworthy and lacking in nothing."'
Eudaimonia alone meets these criteria, and is, therefore, the supreme good
for man.17
It should be emphasized that the supreme good is something which
by definition is manifested in action. As Aristotle puts it, possession of a
disposition (hexis) by itself accomplishes nothing good. But potential motion
or energy (energia) acts (praxei) of necessity, and "acts well" when it
achieves some good result.' 8 Thus, eudaimonia is a state that characterizes a
life (of normal duration), in which virtuous actions are regularly performed.19
1
1097a28-bl. Eudaimonia is typically translated into English as "happiness" or
"flourishing," but neither word captures precisely the meaning of the Greek term. The term
"happiness" is particularly misleading in its suggestion that eudaimoniais a feeling. While it
involves the regulation of feeling, and often is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure,
eudaimonia itself is not a feeling. Nevertheless, I follow common practice in translating
eudaimonia as happiness because the latter term is at least a noun. The term "flourishing"
comes closer in meaning to eudaimonia, as Aristotle uses the term, but says nothing about the
sort of flourishing Aristotle specifically associates with the term.
12
1098al3-16.
13
Id.
14
1094al9-23.
1s
1097a31-35.
16
1097bl6-17.
17
1097a36-bl; 1097bl7-18.
18
1098b32-1099a4.
19
1098a-19. Aristotle also states that virtue (i.e., a well trained disposition)
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Since a life of action is directed outward towards the world in some
way, it follows that excellence is exercised routinely in interpersonal
relations. Man is by nature a political being, that is to say, more exactly, a
creature of the polis; so eudaimonia is sought, to a great extent, in the
context of association with others.20 Thus, although eudaimonia is selfsufficient, people are not. Since eudaimonia involves participation in the
community of the polis, self-sufficiency is not defined by reference to
oneself alone, but depends upon appropriate interaction with family, friends,
and fellow citizens. 21 Therefore, politics is the master science of the supreme
good because politics orders the community of the polis and guides public
22
action.
The science of politics aims at the right kind of activity, namely
actions that are virtuous. 23 But no action is unconditionally good, i.e.,
24
virtuous or just in all conceivable circumstances. Aristotle states that what
constitutes virtuous action differs from case to case and is subject to
variation.25 Therefore, it is possible to draw only generally valid conclusions
about the first principles of virtuous action.26 Because the application of first
principles is context-specific, inferences of those principles must be drawn
from experience of life. 27 Aristotle's insistence on this point leads to his
observation that the young are unfit students of political science, for lack of
life experience prevents them from recognizing the nuances of situational
context.28
Aristotle's claim that the supreme good is manifest in contextspecific action influences his treatment of Plato's Form of the Good. Since
the supreme good is a matter of action rather than knowledge, Plato's Form
cannot be the supreme good by itself because "it seems possible to possess virtue even while
being asleep." (1095a32-33).
20
1097b9-12.
21
Id.
22
1094a30-bl2. There are some virtuous activities, including the very important
one of intellectual contemplation (theoria), that do not, according to Aristotle, require
interaction with others. Therefore, not all virtues require the social context of the polis in order
to become manifest. Moreover, many interpersonal activities are not political in any modem
sense of the term, i.e., they occur in the social context of the polis, but do not involve the
adoption of binding rules of conduct or decisions taken in the name of the polis. Finally, it
bears emphasizing that all virtues, including those that do require personal interaction,
nevertheless belong to the individual actor, and are located in his or her psyche. Virtues are
never themselves interpersonal, i.e., located somehow in the polis.
23
1094b14.
24
1094b17-18.
25
1094b14-17. Rackham translates the subject passage to read that virtue and
justice "involve much difference of opinion and uncertainty." Rackham, supra note 1, at 7.
Irwin translates the passage to read that virtue and justice "differ and vary." Irwin, supra note
1, at 3. Rackham's translation focuses on difference of opinion about what is virtuous or just,
rather than on difference concerning what actually constitutes just or virtuous action in
different situations. Irwin's translation is the better rendition of Aristotle's text.
26
1094b19-23.
27
1095a3-4.
28

1095a3.
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of the Good is considered irrelevant. 29 According to Aristotle, knowledge of
the Form of the Good cannot ensure efficacious action, just as contemplation
of the form of health will not make one a better physician. 30 Determining
how to act begins with what is known to us, not what is knowable
unconditionally.3 ' The starting point is the fact that a thing is so, and it does
not matter why it is so. 3 2 Thus, the mechanics of virtue is a matter of coming
to first principles by inductive inference, rather than by theoretical deduction.
To continue Aristotle's medical analogy, it is not knowledge of the
metaphysically distinct form of human health, but knowledge of the
structure, function, and maintenance of the human organism, together with
detailed observation of organic deviance in a given case, that permits the
physician to cure his or her patient.
Aristotle's second and third claims in Book One are that eudaimonia
is an activity of the soul in conformity with the soul's own excellence or
virtue, and that engagement in this activity in an excellent manner is the
proper excellence of mankind.34 He makes these claims in the form of an
35
argument analogizing the function of a human being to that of a musician.
The argument can be summarized as follows:
1) Every function has its proper excellence, and is well
performed when it is performed according to its own proper
excellence.
2) The good and doing well of anyone who has a function to
perform (for example, a flute-player) reside in the excellent
performance of that function (such as playing the flute well).
3) Human beings have a function to perform as human
beings. Therefore, the good and doing well of a human being
resides in his performance, in an excellent manner, of his
function.
4) Mankind's function is unique to mankind.
5) Exercise of the rational faculty resulting in purposeful
activity is the only activity unique to mankind.
6) Therefore, the good and doing well of a man resides in the
activity of the soul, or psyche, that conforms to reason in an
excellent manner.
This so-called function argument has two distinct elements. Steps
1096b33-35.
1097all-14.
31
1095b2-4.
32
1095b7-8.
3
1097a10- 11. Aristotle's approach thus seeks to separate normative ethics from
metaphysics altogether. Yet in apparent opposition to his claim that political science is the
master science of the supreme good, Aristotle asserts in Book Ten that the greatest human
good lies in imitation of the perfect contemplative activity of the Gods. In doing so, he
explicitly introduces a metaphysical foundation into the Ethics.
34
See supra text accompanying note 12.
3s
1097b24-1098al8.
29
30
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one to three make the crucial assertion that human beings have a
characteristic function. Steps four to six then link the good and doing well of
mankind to the uniqueness of that function. This permits Aristotle to identify
reasoned purposeful conduct as the characteristic human function, rather than
nutrition and growth, or sentient perception, all of which mankind shares
with plants and animals.
There are several obvious objections to Aristotle's claim that
mankind has a unique function. First, "man" is not, like "flute-player," a
clearly functional term. Therefore, even if it is true that human beings have a
function, it is not obvious that their goodness consists in performing that
function well. In short, there is a kind of mono-functional purposiveness built
into the term "flute-player," which is not built into the term "man."
Second, Aristotle's assertion that the characteristic human function is
unique to humans does not square with his argument in Book Ten that the
supreme good for human beings is theoria.36 As background to this
objection, it should be noted that the rational activity of the soul, to which
Aristotle refers in his functional argument, comprehends both practical
reason (phronesis) and theoria, through which individuals achieve epistime
(i.e., knowledge of scientific laws).3 Arguably the latter is also active
(praktikei tis), even though it need not result in purposeful action, because it
involves the use, not merely the possession, of an intellectual faculty. 38
Moreover, Aristotle states that if the soul's faculties should have more than
one excellence, then the good for man involves the activity of the soul in
conformity with the best of them.39 This claim lays the foundation for his
argument in Book Ten that the supreme good for human beings is theoria,
rather than any other virtuous activity or combination of virtuous activities,
because theoria is the highest excellence of the human soul, and affords the
greatest pleasure.40 Viewed against this background, the human function
includes, and possibly achieves its highest expression, in theoria. But this
claim runs afoul of Aristotle's uniqueness assertion because the gods also
engage in theoria, according to Aristotle, 4' and presumably do so better than
human beings because their contemplative activity is perfect and eternal.
Thus, if the term "function" or "characteristic function" requires that the
object or being that performs that function do so uniquely, or better than any
other object or being, then Aristotle has failed on his own terms to identify
mankind's function in this argument.
These objections are not fatal. However, the most important
objection to Aristotle's function argument is that it seems to rest on
metaphysical premises that are incompatible with modern science. Aristotle
36

1177a18.

37

1139bl4-36.

40

1146b31-35.
1098al6-19.
1177al2-18.

41

1178b7-24.

38

39
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holds that the soul of an organism is the potentiality of matter to act or
42
perform in ways characteristic of the living thing to which it belongs. In
other words, the soul is the organizing principle of a living thing, that which
determines its purpose or telos (e.g., in growing, reproducing, moving,
perceiving, thinking, etc.). Pursuant to its organizational structure, the wellbeing of a living thing consists in the coordinated and integrated functioning
of its capabilities. If an axe were alive, then cutting would be the activity
proper to the soul of the axe, and cutting well the virtuous fulfillment of its
function. Analogously, rational activity is the kind of activity most proper to
the soul of a human being, and acting well in accordance with reason is the
fulfillment of a human being's function.4 3
According to Richard Kraut, Aristotle's metaphysical views on the
soul and its relationship to the body are open to possible objection on several
counts. Among them, the following are particularly salient. First, Aristotle's
leads to the objection that it
belief "in the fixity and eternality of species'
precludes the possibility of species change. Kraut's own response to this
objection is that ethics is a practical science and, therefore, "should leave
aside anything that makes no practical difference" to the analysis of correct
action. 45 Thus, although modem science accepts the view that species
develop and change over time, we are entitled to treat human beings as
unchanging for the purpose of ethical analysis because possible future
alteration of the species makes no difference to how we ought to act here and
now. 4
One possible rejoinder to Kraut's response is that it licenses
disregard of the consequences moral decisions often have for the lives of
future human beings. But Kraut's response does not entitle moral agents to
disregard the future moral consequences of present actions. It entitles them
only to disregard the possibility that human beings in the future may be
functionally distinct from themselves. This is justified because: (1) it is
impossible to anticipate the consequences of actions for (human?) beings
This concept of soul underlies step three of Aristotle's function argument. See
supra text accompanying note 37. It also underlies several other arguments made by Aristotle
elsewhere in the Ethics. First, it underlies his claim that friends are a choiceworthy object of a
virtuous person's perception because it is good, and therefore pleasant, to perceive their
performance of the human function, namely active engagement in perception and thought.
(l 170al6-1170bl 3). It also underlies Aristotle's claim that people should engage in theoria
because the activity of the intellect. (1 177b30-l178a3).
43
Irwin, supra note 1, at 426. Two important qualifications follow from this
analogy. First, organizational purposiveness implies a built-in end or aim, but not in the sense
of conscious intentionality. It implies only the existence of typical behavior. Second, the soul
is not a thing separate from the body so an organism's true self includes the various parts that
compose its living physique. Rather, the soul is that which unifies (or describes) the various
parts of an organism into (as) a single, purposive thing, characterized by typical functional
capabilities
4
RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE: POLITICAL PILOSOPHY 91 (2002).
42

45

Id. at 91-92.

46

id.
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with yet-to-be-determined functions; and (2) functionally relevant species
change would have to be very great and, presumably, the result of a process
whose completion would therefore be in the very remote future.
A second, perhaps more significant, objection asserts that Aristotle's
metaphysics "is an unsustainable hybrid: because he holds that corporeal
organization is caused by an animal's good, he illegitimately brings together
two spheres that must be kept apart-the normative and the explanatory.'A7
Kraut's response to this objection is that Aristotle's conception of well-being
remains viable even when detached from his metaphysics because it is
intuitively appealing. 48 Thus, "[b]y reflecting on our ideas about proper
human development from childhood to adulthood, and the central role played
in a well-lived life by skills of thought, feeling, and social interaction,
Aristotle's conclusion-that well-being consists in the skillful deployment of
our capacity to give and respond to reasons-can be sustained.'4 9 Kraut's
response concedes the unpersuasiveness of Aristotle's metaphysics, but has
the merit of employing Aristotle's own common sense form of
argumentation in the Ethics, in that it begins with what is known to us, i.e.,
experience, as the foundation for further analysis. Based upon this approach,
it asserts that the entire edifice of Aristotle's Ethics should not fall simply
because it rests, in part, upon metaphysical premises that seem primitive
from the standpoint of modem scientific theory.
Two other objections to Aristotle's metaphysics might be mentioned
only to be dismissed, since they are both canards.so The first asserts that
Aristotle's definition of the characteristic human function as activity of the
soul in conformity with reason is too broad because there are many activities
included under the general rubric of this definition that are not uniquely
human. For example, many animals care for their young, remain faithful to
their mates, and sacrifice themselves for the sake of the community to which
they belong. The obvious response to this objection is that activity is not
characteristically human unless it is undertaken in conformity with reason,
and that animals, even though some do engage in similar activities, do so
more in conformity with instinct than reason. Even if some animals do
engage in reason to some extent when engaged in such activities, human
reason is nevertheless sufficiently more powerful and determinative to
constitute a difference in kind.
The second objection asserts that Aristotle's definition of the
characteristic human function is too narrow, i.e., that there are many
important human activities, such as eating, that do not seem to fall within the
definition, but which are characteristically human activities. The answer to
this objection is that such activities, while not intellectual in themselves, are
47
48

Id. at 85.

49

id.

id.

so For a general discussion of these two objections, see GERALD J. HUGHES,
ARISTOTLE ON ETHIcs 38-41 (Tim Crane & Jonathan Wolff eds., Routledge 2001).
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(or should be) pursued in conformity with reason, and therefore do fit within
Aristotle's definition of human function. A better form of this objection is to
attack Aristotle's further qualification (in Book ten) that the characteristic
human function, when exercised in the most excellent manner, comprises not
every activity in conformity with reason, but only the best such activity, i.e.,
theoria. For this qualification does leave out of the picture many important
rational activities that are characteristic of human beings. However,
Aristotle's qualification does not commit him to the idea that activities other
than theoria have no value. He can still assert that such activities are
important and characteristic. His claim is only that such activities are not
essential to achievement of the highest degree of human well-being.
Moreover, Aristotle's qualification is necessary only to Book Ten of the
Ethics, and its removal does nothing to weaken the argument developed by
Aristotle in the first nine books.
Steps one to three of Aristotle's function argument also introduce the
claim that each function has its own proper excellence, according to which
the quality of the performance of that function may be measured. This
assertion establishes the normative foundation of Aristotle's Ethics, but to
place the notion of normative correctness in its proper perspective, one
should observe that Aristotle himself was not particularly concerned with the
universal application of moral virtues, and considered it sufficient for his
purpose to provide practical guidance to his audience of wealthy young
Athenian citizens. Thus, in the Ethics he repeatedly asserts that one should
not expect as much precision in political science as in the study of the
sciences." This is because the great variety of circumstances that surround
human action make it impossible to define moral virtues in any but rough,
general terms. Thus, even though Aristotle would say that the correctness of
any given action is an objective matter, he would nevertheless resist any
effort to define virtues precisely.
In contrast, Martha Nussbaum argues that at least one major task of
Aristotelean ethics is to approach ever greater precision and completeness in
the specification of moral virtues and the disjunction of actions that comprise
correct functioning under them. "Success in the eliminative task," she argues,
will result in "a (probably small) plurality of acceptable accounts" of any
given virtue.52 As a hypothetical example of this process, she notes that "if
we should succeed in ruling out conceptions of the proper attitude to one's
own human worth that are based on a notion of original sin, this would be
moral work of enormous significance . . . .

Nussbaum asserts that the

process of eliminative specification applies not only to the "concrete fillings"
of moral virtues, but to the identification of moral virtues themselves. Thus,
51 See, e.g., 1194b23-27.
52

Martha Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in
ETHICAL THEORY: CHARACTER AND VIRTuE 32, 44 (Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr.
& Howard K. Wettstein eds., 1988) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues].
" Id. at 44.
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according to her, the fact that "one can . . . imagine forms of human life that

do not contain the holding of private property" renders the moral virtue of
generosity questionable on the ground that it is not truly universal in

applicability.5 4
The eliminative task leads Nussbaum to propose a list of functions
that rests upon "an account of what it is to be a human being,"55 or "what it is
to function humanly."5 The precise normative role of this list of functions is
somewhat unclear. On the one hand, it is a "working list,"57 an "open-ended
list" that specifies "vaguely certain basic functionings that should, as
constitutive of human life, concern us." 8 On the other hand,
[a]s far as capabilities go, it is clear that calling them part of
humanness is making a very basic sort of evaluation. It is to
say that life without this item would be too lacking, too
impoverished, to be human at all. A fortiori,it could not be a
good human life. So this list of capabilities is a kind of
ground-floor, or minimal conception of the good.
Taken as a composite statement of what the human function is, and
therefore what individuals must perform well in order to achieve
eudaimonia, Nussbaum's list is highly problematic. Consider items three
("Being able to avoid unnecessary and non-useful pain, and to have
pleasurable experiences") and four ("Being able to use the five senses; being
able to imagine, to think and reason").6 0 As Mary Beard points out, item four
appears at a stroke to exclude persons with certain physical disabilities from
the possibility of functioning in a human way, and thereby being able to lead
virtuous lives. 61 As for item three, Beard states,
What is to count as [non-useful] pain that none of us ought
to suffer? . .. Does it, for example, include piercing? Or is

that [useful], in the sense that it provides a means of selfexpression (another desideratum on her list) or brings kudos
within a particular social group? And what of orthodontics?
[Useful] because it allows one to conform to certain socially
approved norms of appearance? Or [non-useful] for
precisely the same reason ...?62
Nussbaum tries to accommodate cultural variety through the concept
of "local specification," which recognizes that "the constitutive
circumstances of human life, while broadly shared, are themselves realized
54

ss
56
5
5

59
60
61

Id. at 50; see also id. at 42-43.
Nussbaum, Aristotelian SocialDemocracy, supra note 6, at 217.
Id. at 208; see also id. at 205, 225.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, supranote 6, at 225.
Mary Beard, The Dangerof Making Lists, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Mar.

17, 2000, at 6.
62

id
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in different forms in different societies."6 3 But if the list of human functions
is accommodating in this respect, it will, as Beard implies, end up
accommodating opposites, in which case it is rendered meaningless.
Therefore, "the Aristotelian does not simply defer to local traditions . . . .'
But going in this direction quickly commits Nussbaum to a highly specific
and detailed list of definitions of the human good that is insufficiently
attentive to cultural and individual context.
Whatever the merits of Nussbaum's approach to the task of
normative ethics, it is not an approach Aristotle himself would endorse. With
respect to Nussbaum's observation about the virtue of generosity, Aristotle
would likely reply that there are forms of generosity that do not require the
possession of private wealth. Alternatively, he might reply that generosity,
defined specifically as giving away one's wealth, might exist as a virtue in
one place, where there is private property, but not in another, where there is
no private property. Both of these answers rest upon the circumstantial
particularity of Aristotelean correctness. Neither in his definition of the
characteristic human function, nor subsequently even in his discussions of
individual virtues, does Aristotle seek or achieve the degree of specificity in
the definition of universally valid moral virtues Nussbaum wishes to obtain.
Because of this, one might more reasonably push in the opposite direction
towards a more (though still neo-) Aristotelean assertion that it just is the
mechanics of virtue, combined with a basic set of broadly defined moral
virtues, that constitute the proper human function and therefore establish the
limits of the normative and universal elements of ethics.
It is also noteworthy that even though Aristotle does draw a link
between excellent performance and doing well, his general evaluative criteria
for measuring the correctness of human action are remarkably
underdeveloped by contemporary standards. Aside from his well known
endorsement of moderation in the exercise of dispositions (itself a notion
relativized to individual characteristics), 6 5 Aristotle offers little beyond a
circular argument that goodness is measured according to what a good
individual would do. Such evaluative criteria could not possibly support the
"eliminative task" Nussbaum wishes to undertake.
However, drawing the link between excellent performance of the
human function and doing well does allow Aristotle to conclude in a separate
argument that virtuous action is essentially pleasant (by nature) because it is
pleasant to those who excel in performing the function of man. In contrast,
a morally inferior person likes activity that is pleasant owing only to
something extraneous and contingent, such as idiosyncratic taste, and not to

63
6
65
66

67

Nussbaum, AristotelianSocial Democracy, supra note 6, at 234.
Id. at 236.
1106a29-33; 1107a2-3; 1108bll-13.
1105b22-24; 1106b36-1107a2.
1099al0-22.
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goodness inherent in the activity itself.68 As a result, the pleasures of a
morally inferior person often conflict with one another, as when an
individual has conflicting tastes and urges simultaneously. 69 In contrast, the
pleasure of a virtuous person is never subject to conflict since it arises from
the inherent goodness of virtuous activity, and virtues, at least those
recognized by Aristotle, if not all virtues in principle, never conflict. 70 There
can be no such conflict when all capacities are engaged in activity that is in
harmony with reason. Thus, the pleasure of the virtuous person is a stable
condition of the soul, while that of the morally inferior person is hostage to
passing fancy or peculiar tastes. 71
Aristotle adds an important qualification to the definition of
eudaimonia.Virtuous activity must occupy a complete lifetime.7 2 In part, this
requirement recognizes that severe and repeated reversals of fortune can
destroy the eudaimonia of a virtuous person. Yet, according to Aristotle
there is no human occupation in which eudaimonia enjoys such permanence
as that which is obtained in virtuous activity.74 The eudaimon will never be
miserable; " he will accept misfortune nobly, and retain his stability
throughout life. 76
This qualification relates far more significantly to the notion that the
full development and expression of virtue requires experience gained from a
complete lifetime of activity. Since virtue in the polis is not a matter of
theoretical knowledge, but of choosing the correct action in an indefinite
variety of situational contexts, there can be no substitute for experience in
developing judgment capable of gauging the nuances of specific facts. It is
78
for this reason that ethics is not a fit science for the young.
68
69
70

1099al3.
1099al2.

1099al3-15.
This argument introduces the idea of a hierarchy of pleasures. All pleasures are
a condition of the soul, but those of the virtuous man are superior because they are derived
from fulfillment of the human being's unique function. Aristotle makes this hierarchy explicit
in Book Ten, in which he asserts that the greatest pleasure is that derived from theoria.
(l1l75b37-1176a3). It should be noted that the virtuous man's pleasure, although stable, is not
continuous. For example, the courageous man cannot be pleased by the prospect of his own
death, precisely because his virtue makes his life worth prolonging. Nevertheless, the pleasure
taken from the prospect of continued life does not conflict with the pain arising from the
anticipation of virtuous self-sacrifice, because they are arranged hierarchically, and therefore
harmoniously, in accordance with reason.
72
1098al7-20; 1100a4.
73
1100b22-30.
71

74

1100bl12-14.

75
76

1101a7.

7

1100b20-21.

1095a3-5.
Aristotle adds a closely related qualification as well, though one less important
for the purposes of the argument made here. He asserts that one must realize complete, lifelong goodness in action (or at least steady progress towards achieving complete goodness) and
be adequately furnished with external goods, such as adequate financial resources and friends.
(11 01aI5). Without these, even the stable moral agent's opportunities for virtuous action are
78
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C. Training the Dispositions (and Practical Reason)
It is clear from the above that eudaimonia depends on virtue, and
that virtue is an activity of the soul that conforms to reason. It constitutes the
good and doing well of a human being. However, it is also clear that virtue is
not easy to achieve. First principles are only a starting point, and it takes
years to develop the capacity to sift through context-specific facts in order to
determine just how to act in every situation. Since possible factual
combinations are infinite, the virtuous agent must somehow learn to
extrapolate from experience in order to determine which actions are
appropriate even in novel situations. Given the apparent difficulty of the task,
how is one to become virtuous?
Before answering this question, one must consider Aristotle's effort
in Book Two to define moral virtue (arete), a state of the soul that logically
precedes virtuous action itself.79 Aristotle considers three possible states of
the soul and concludes that arete is neither an emotion (pathei) nor a
capacity (dunamis), but rather a disposition (hexis)." An important aspect of
this argument is Aristotle's suggestion that the three states of the soul are
interrelated. Specifically, pathai are states of consciousness accompanied by
pleasure or pain, such as desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, or joy;
dunameis are the faculties through which we are subject to pathai; and hexeis
are the formed states of character, in virtue of which we are well or ill
disposed with respect to the various emotions that motivate and accompany
81
action. Since virtues are dispositions, they therefore amount to a tendency
to act in, or react to, a situation with a particular kind of emotion and with a
particular level of intensity, and to feel pleasure or pain accordingly. As
Aristotle puts it, moral virtue is the quality of acting (praktikei) in relation to
constrained.
Both qualifications relate tangentially to the question of whether our virtue is up to
us, or the result of good fortune. In Book One, Aristotle brackets the issue, stating simply that
since it is better to flourish as a result of one's own exertions than by the gift of fortune, it is
reasonable to suppose that this is how eudaimonia is won. (1099b20-24). Thus, his formal
definition of virtue in Book Two states that virtue involves choice (proairesis). (1 106b351 107a1). In Book Three, which takes up the question of what makes action praiseworthy or
blameworthy, Aristotle defines choice as the deliberate desire of things in the agent's power to
achieve, (11 13a10-13), and assimilates this requirement to the notion of moral responsibility.
Book Three also considers the distinct question of voluntariness, or what it means
for action to be the result of one's own exertion. According to Aristotle, a voluntary act is one
of which the origin lies in an agent who knows the relevant circumstances in which he acts.
(I 111a22-24). Voluntariness is implied by choice. Therefore, issues related specifically to
voluntariness are of no special significance other than to highlight the importance of choice as
a pre-condition of moral responsibility. Without choice, actions may be good or base, but the
actor neither vicious nor virtuous.
79
Arete logically precedes action because it is a hexis proairetike, a state of the
soul that determines the choice of action. (1 106b36).
80
1105b19-21.
81
1105b21-27.
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82

pleasure and pain as the best men do, and vice is the opposite.
In more concrete terms, Aristotle asserts that virtuous dispositions
lead to actions that avoid excess and deficiency, hitting the mean relative to
the particular agent. 83 Thus, for example, "liberality (eleutherioteis) is the
mean in regard to giving and receiving money, wastefulness (asotia) and
illiberality (aneleutherioteis)the excess and deficiency."84 The requirement
that the mean be measured in relation to the particular agent, rather than in
relation to an objective standard, indicates Aristotle's view that the
characteristics of the agent comprise part of the complex factual specificity
of each situation.
Having defined arete, Aristotle makes a number of important
observations about it. First, neither moral virtue nor vice is the product of
nature. 86 Human beings are blank slates, though not characterless, since that
slate is provided by nature with the capacity to receive either virtue or vice.
Second, "virtue is the product of habit,"88 formed through repetition of
corresponding actions. 89 We acquire arete only by having practiced virtuelike behavior first. 90 For example, "we become just by doing just acts,
temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts." 9' Third,
Aristotle notes that it is necessary for us to control the character of our
activities, since the quality of our dispositions depends upon the quality of
our actions. 9 2 Thus, "it is necessary that the moral agent be well trained in his
habits concerning the good and the just and all things that are involved in
82
1104b27-29. The role of emotion in this calculus is a little unclear, for many
virtues do not seem to involve emotion in any direct way. For example, theoria, even if it
involves, or results from, a disposition to engage in contemplation, does not seem to require or
to be accompanied by emotion, although it does afford pleasure. On the other hand, there are
some virtues that directly involve regulation of the emotions. For example, Aristotle states that
"we have a bad disposition towards anger, if we become too angry, or not angry enough, but
we have a good disposition if we become moderately angry . . . ." (1105b26-29). The
important point is that choice and action are accompanied by pleasure or pain, and these are
motivating factors in the development of hexeis. (1104b21-24). However, even this is
confused somewhat by Aristotle's statement that there is a specific virtue relating to the
feeling of due pleasure and pain, sophrosunei. (1 107b4-7).
83
1104al2-13; 1106b6-8; 1106b36-1107a3; 1108b11-13.

84

11 07b9-1

1.

1106a29-1106b5.
86
1103al8-20.
87
11 03a24-26. This is Aristotle's fundamental view, yet he variously asserts that
human beings possess their characters to some degree by nature, (1144b4-5), and that love of
pleasure inclines human beings towards vice. (110410-11). The basic point is that human
character is sufficiently malleable (and the power of desire for pleasure sufficiently powerful)
that both virtue and vice are possible in every case, depending mainly upon how one is
habituated.
88
1103al7-18; 1103a24-26.
89
1103b22-23.
90
1103a31-33; 1104a27-30.
91
11031-3.
92
1103b23-24.
85
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politics generally." 3
This last point indicates the importance of moral education. Aristotle
states that "it matters not a little whether we are trained from earliest
childhood in one set of habits or another; rather it is very, or even supremely,
important." 9 4 In a sense, the whole purpose of politics is to provide this
moral training. "Lawgivers make the citizens good by training them in habits
of virtue, and this is the aim of every lawgiver; those who do not do this well
are failures, and in this way the good state differs from the bad."95 Barring
exceptional luck, it is clear that one does not acquire virtue, or become an
eudaimon, without the help of others.
Moral training motivates through the medium of pleasure and pain.96
Aristotle notes that susceptibility to pleasure has grown up with us from the
cradle, and indeed is ingrained in us. As a result, "we do base actions for
the sake of pleasure, and avoid doing noble ones in order to avoid pain." 99
9
94

1095b5-7.

1103b23-25.

1103b3-7. This conception of politics as a source of moral education leads
Aristotle in Book Eight to endorse kingship as the best form of government in principle.
(1160a36). Perhaps Aristotle takes this view because, in his mind, the relationship between
king and subject resembles that of teacher and student. The inference of this resemblance
follows from the explicit comparison of the relationship between king and subject to that
between father and child, (1 160b23-26), for parents are obviously the most important teachers
of character. If the king is like a teacher, then he is ideally suited to carry out the function of
political science. However, Aristotle's complete presentation of friendship in Books Eight and
Nine indicates, or at least hints at the possibility, that a form of alternative, continuing moral
education is derived, to some degree, from a complex web of friendships, rather than through
a single, idealized relationship. In turn, this supports an inference that interaction among
political friends is important for the achievement of best political results. This interpretation of
Aristotle's view on the role of friendship in moral education and the inference it supports
concerning political decision-making, although justified by the text, are perhaps inconsistent
with the view that kingship is the best form of government.
96
1104b9-10; 1105al3-16.
9
1105a2.
98
1105a3-4.
9
1104b10-11. This assertion comes perilously close to suggesting that human
beings have a natural tendency towards vice. In fact, Aristotle elsewhere reiterates his fear that
human beings are easily led astray. For example, in Book Seven, he states that many people
pursue excessive bodily pleasures in order to drive out the pain caused by lack of pleasure.
They are drawn to the intensity of bodily pleasures because they are incapable of enjoying
other pleasures. Like children in a state of exhilaration, excitable natures always need
remedial action. They are exposed to a constant gnawing sensation, a state of vehement desire,
which leads them to become self-indulgent. (1154a26-l154bl6). If that is indeed what
Aristotle believes, it contradicts his prior assertion that human beings are born with a capacity
for virtue and vice, but an inclination towards neither. One could argue that if, in fact, more
people lack moral virtue than possess it, the fault lies in the de facto absence of a sufficiently
large group of sufficiently good teachers of virtue, rather than in any flaw of human nature.
However, this line of argument begs the question of why there should consistently be a de
facto lack of sufficiently good moral teachers, if not as a result of a flaw in human nature. It is
implausible to assert that moral training simply got off on the wrong foot, so to speak, and as a
result mankind is doomed to moral mediocrity through an unbreakable chain of repeated
instances of poor training. On the other hand, if this were Aristotle's argument, it would
95
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Thus, "[v]irtue has to do with pleasure and pain" because one must be taught
to like and dislike the proper things.'"
Although it motivates through the promise of a reward, the essence
of moral training, or proper habituation, is that it causes the student
ultimately to do virtuous acts for their own sake, and to take pleasure in
doing so, even if such acts were originally onerous.'o1 Early in the course of
one's training, one engages in just (or temperate, brave, magnanimous, etc.)
acts, without oneself being just (or temperate, brave, magnanimous, etc.).o 2
The student may not realize that the acts are virtuous, or do them only
reluctantly and without pleasure. But virtue is not achieved without the
proper mental element that accompanies habituation.10 3
Several significant problems or inconsistencies lie hidden beneath
Aristotle's observations about moral education. For example, since virtue
requires activity accompanied by a particular mental state, it is clear that it
engages an intellectual capacity as well as trained dispositions. But moral
training focuses on habituation of dispositions alone. In fact, Aristotle states
explicitly at the beginning of Book Two that intellectual virtue is the product
of precept rather than habit.'"0 Therefore, it seems to fall outside the scope of
explain his insistence upon the significance of moral education in the cultivation of both virtue
and vice.
100
101
102

1105a13.
1105a29-1105bl.

1105b9-12.
1105b5-9. Aristotle distinguishes moral virtue from craft-knowledge (techne)
on the basis of its mental requirement. (1 105a26-1105b12). Techne concerns expertise in the
making of things that may either exist or not exist, and the efficient cause of which lies in the
maker, not the thing made. (1 140al 1-14). But the products of techne determine by their own
character whether they are excellent or not. Thus, a word is well spelled if and only if it is
spelled correctly; it does not matter whether it was spelled correctly by chance or intentionally
as the result of expertise in spelling. (1105a3-7). In contrast, actions do not determine by their
own character whether they have been done well or not. This is because the agent must not
only act in conformity with virtue, but in doing so must have a certain state of mind, i.e., in
addition to acting from deliberate choice, the agent must, as a result of proper training of the
relevant disposition, choose the action for its own sake. Virtue requires that the act be done for
its own sake because virtue is an end in itself, something with intrinsic, rather than merely
instrumental, value. Aristotle summarizes the importance of the mental element in moral
virtue when he states that "one who acts in a temperate and just manner is not just and
temperate by reason of his actions alone, but only when he acts in the way a temperate and
just man would act." (1105b8).
Having drawn this distinction between techne and arete, Aristotle nevertheless fails
to address the issue of just how the student learns to do an act for its own sake. He asserts that
moral training motivates through pleasure and pain. Pain is used as corrective treatment for
failure to learn properly. (1 104b1 17-19). This implies that bribery is also used to encourage a
student to do well. But the pain and pleasure of punishment and bribery will teach the student
to act for the sake of the bribe or the avoidance of punishment, not for the sake of the
goodness inherent in the act. How does the student learn to act for the sake of the act itself?
The best answer may be that repetition of actions actually increases the pleasure they afford,
so that the bribe eventually becomes irrelevant, but Aristotle himself has no answer to this
conundrum.
'" 1103al5-16.
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moral training, and Aristotle's description of moral training seems to be
incomplete.
This is even more puzzling when one considers that the mental
aspect of correct moral choice must require not only the desire to do an act
for its own sake, but also the ability to recognize the proposed act as one that
is correct. In other words, arete requires reason so that one will know how to
act virtuously in novel situations. By definition, novel situations present one
with the need to engage in actions one has never previously undertaken,
much less undertaken repeatedly. It is hard to imagine how habituation,
without more, could prepare one for such a task. Presumably, it is the
application of reason that allows one to extrapolate by analogy from
accumulated experiences, and perhaps vicariously from those of others, in
order to determine how one should act when faced with a variety of
possibilities in a completely new situation. If moral excellence demands the
exercise of both reason and stable dispositions, moral education must
account for the development of each. It must include the guided, habitual
accumulation of appropriate dispositions and also the development of
sufficient intellectual maturity to engage successfully in the inferential and
analogical thinking applied reason requires.
The best solution to this puzzle is to treat Aristotle's comment about
the training of intellectual virtues as an overgeneralization rather than an
inconsistency. According to this interpretation, Aristotle's claim really
applies only to the intellectual virtues involved in theoria, i.e., scientific
knowledge (episteme), intuition (nous), and wisdom (sophia), which
combines the two.'os These intellectual virtues all involve the apprehension
of things that cannot be otherwise, truths that are necessary, eternal, and
universal.106 Such are the truths that can be taught by precept. 107
In contrast, technical knowledge (techne) and practical reason
(phronesis) are forms of grasping the truth about things that can be otherwise
than they are.' 08 Phronesis is the intellectual capacity through which we
grasp truth with respect to action and, therefore, is the intellectual virtue
involved in moral choice.109 It proceeds from the last thing, i.e., particular
facts, whereas episteme proceeds from the first thing, i.e., first principles.11 o
In method, phronesis relies upon intellectual perception (aisthesis) of the
los

ll41al6-20; 1141b3-4.

1139b20-25; 1140b31-32. Episteme proceeds by demonstration, which is
deduction from first principles. (1139b28-32; 1140b32-34). Therefore, what is known
scientifically is demonstrable. But the first principles of scientific knowledge are not.
(1139b28-32; 1140b33-35). One arrives at first principles through a process of induction
(epagogei), working upward from known facts. Nous is the state that grasps the truth about the
origins of what cannot be otherwise. (1 139b28-29; 1141a3-8). It is not a form of episteme,
(1 140b30-34), but a necessary pre-condition to episteme. (1 139b33-34).
107 1139b25-26.
'os 1140al-2; 1140a32.
109 1140b6-8; 1140b20-22.
110 1140b31-34; 1141bl5-17; 1142a24-28.
'0
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relevant facts of a particular situation and, by means of the so-called practical
syllogism, applies general principles to them in order to determine by
deductive inference what action is to be done."' The general principles are
themselves extrapolated from the deductive inferences made in many
particular instances, and are therefore subject to revision by the same
iterative process in which they are applied.' 12
The development of excellence in constructing the practical
1142a24-28; 1144a31-34.
Aristotle's analysis of phronesis and nous is somewhat opaque. As noted, he
refers to phronesis as a quality or state (hexis) that is rational (meta logou) and concerned with
attaining the truth in matters of action (hexis praktikei) that are good or bad for human beings.
Indeed, Aristotle explicitly indicates that phronesis is a form of deduction that operates
through the practical syllogism. See supra notes 109-111 and accompanying text. Moreover,
in his discussion of deliberative excellence, he states that "it is possible to arrive at the truth
through a false syllogism" (sullogismus), "and to determine what one should do, but not why
one should do it, by means of a false middle term" (mesos horos, i.e., minor premise).
(1 142b23-25). Thus, phronesis seems to be a form of deductive reasoning through which
general principles are applied to specific facts in order to determine how to act.
However, Aristotle also refers to phronesis as a form of aisthesis,or perception, that
intuits both the particular, relevant facts of a situation (for example, that the masked man who
breaks into a house and runs out again with a television under his arm is engaged in a theft),
and the general principles that govern correct action (for example, that one should notify the
police in the event of a theft). (I 142a24-28; I141bl4-15). This is a quite different description
of phronesis. In addition, Aristotle also describes nous as a similar capacity that intuits the
relevant facts of a situation. (1 143a35-1143b4).
Several related problems follow from these definitions. First, if phronesis and nous
both involve a kind of intuition, how do they differ? Second, if nous involves a form of
intuition, how can it also be a form of knowledge that results from induction (epagogei)?
Third, if phronesis involves a kind of intuition, how can it also involve a process of
deliberative reason?
It seems unlikely that all these problems can be completey untangled because they
seem to involve using the terms phronesis and nous to denote both intellectual qualities or
states of apprehending truth, and capacities associated with attaining those states. In his initial
division of the rational part of the soul into different faculties or capacities, Aristotle states
that "when the objects are different in kind, the parts of the soul corresponding to them also
differ in kind, since knowledge of the objects depends upon a likeness or affinity between the
parts of the soul and their objects." (1 139a9-12). Concerning the first problem, one could
perhaps then say that phronesis and nous, though functionally similar, are different in kind
because their objects (i.e., the truth of things that can and cannot vary) differ. However, one is
still left with the problem that nous seems to be involved in attaining both kinds of truth.
Concerning the second problem, one might argue that induction is just a special case of
intuition, so that there is no contradiction in the various applications of nous. In support of this
view, Aristotle does state that the first principles underlying scientific deduction cannot
themselves be the product of reason. (1 142a27). With respect to the third problem, a closer
reading of key passages indicates that phronesis is concerned with particular facts, which are
discovered through intuition or intellectual perception, but one needn't conceive of phronesis
itself as the capacity through which the relevant facts become known. (1141b14-16; 1142a2628). This interpretation nicely solves both the first and third problems up to a point, but we are
still left with Aristotle's unequivocal assertion that phronesis involves the use of intellectual
perception or intuition to discover general principles of action. Nevertheless, one can then
understand nous and phronesis as similar forms of inductive intuition that discover first
principles, in one case that ground the process of scientific deduction and in the other that
ground choice of action.
"
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syllogism depends little upon learned precept and much more upon practice
in actual choice-making, and therefore seems to accompany the development
of moral virtue. This follows from the fact that phronesis depends upon
moral virtue, without which it is merely cleverness, a capacity to calculate
well to achieve vicious as well as fine ends, without the guidance of moral
virtue." 3 Given the interdependence of phronesis and moral virtue, it is
implausible to conclude that Aristotle did not understand their development
as interlinked in a single educative process.
Another problem is that Aristotle's account of moral education is
unpersuasive in its attribution of moral autonomy, and therefore
responsibility, to the moral agent. This follows from the fact that good moral
training seems to depend upon the student's ability to secure a virtuous
teacher. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any way to retrieve
Aristotle's account of moral education on this point, for his commonsensical
notion of personal responsibility does not address deeper questions about

human freedom. 114
The single greatest problem in Aristotle's description of moral
education is its lack of any specificity regarding its scope. Who teaches?
How long does the process take? What does instruction consist of? Aristotle
does not answer such questions because his comments are not intended to be
a comprehensive theory of education. However, it is clear that Aristotle
imagines the process of moral education taking place between parent and
child, or between tutor and student, in either case a specific, finite
undertaking defined by a single, formal relationship. Within this
straightforward relationship, the student acts only as his or her tutor tells him
or her to do, thereby so internalizing his or her tutor's teachings that the
student thereafter acts on the basis of the teachings alone. The former student
will then have developed dispositions and matured into a responsible moral
agent. However, one might also imagine moral education as a more
1144a128-36. Phronesis is by definition the application of practical reason
"
guided by moral virtue. When moral virtue is absent, practical reason is not phronimos (i.e.,
intelligent, in the sense of wise), but deinoteita (i.e., intelligence, in the sense of cleverness in
obtaining one's end).
114
Aristotle does anticipate this problem in a slightly different context. In Book
Three he poses a hypothetical objection, which asserts that morally inferior men cannot be
blamed for the conception of the good their characters cause them to seek, if they do not
control the development of their characters. (1114a30-1114b13). This objection is based upon
the supposition that character is determined by nature, not by education. However, it addresses
the same issue, for the crucial claim is that character is beyond the agent's control, whether by
reason of nature or nurture.
Aristotle's response to the objection is to assert that if a virtuous man's character is
given by nature, but his actions voluntarily done (prattein hekousios), so that his virtue is
voluntary, then the same can be said of the vicious man. (ll 4bl 8-21). However, Aristotle
does not explain why virtuous actions voluntarily done in conformity to a pre-determined
conception of the good render the virtuous man responsible for his virtue, and therefore
praiseworthy. His answer seems to endorse a naive form of free will compatibilism, according
to which the moral agent's responsibility would cease only if he were prevented from acting
according to choice, or his actions were compelled contrary to his will.
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comprehensive, diffuse, and informal process. In fact, warrant for this is
provided by Aristotle's own contrast between the precision of theoretical
reason and the fact-specific, proximate nature of moral reasoning from
general principles of action. Recalling from Aristotle's discussion of political
science that principles of correct action are only generally valid, that they
must be drawn by inference from experience of life, and that their application
is context-specific, one might reasonably envision moral education as an ongoing process, in which appropriate dispositions and the ability to apply
intellectual discernment to questions of action emerge and coalesce only
gradually. On this view, virtue is not a matter of learning unconditional
principles, but of mastering an approach to life, and this requires time and the
filtering of vast amounts of factual data until a general picture comes into
focus. One imagines that the moral student might learn in many ways, such
as by example, direct exhortation, through critical evaluation and reevaluation. He or she might learn from many sources, including direct
experience, observation of others, advice, even from consideration of the
experiences of fictional as well as real people. Finally, the variety of sources
is also important, so one imagines the student leaming from a wide variety of
moral tutors, ranging across the spectrum, from moral experts to moral
rogues, in a wide variety of relationships with varying degrees of formality
and consistency. Only moral education viewed across such a sprawling
landscape captures the richness and complexity of moral life, as well as the
provisional character of all moral choices.
This picture of moral education identifies its scope with that of moral
practice. One learns to be a moral agent in precisely the same contexts in
which one acts as a moral agent. This version of moral education is at least
compatible with, if not directly suggested by, Aristotle's insistence that
achievement of virtue, and therefore the supreme good, requires the
accumulation of vast experience and must be practiced throughout life.
Moreover, Aristotle's discussion of friendship elaborates a number of the
relationships that furnish the material for both moral doing and moral
learning in the wide sense suggested here. Finally, the diffuse form of moral
education outlined here does helpfully mitigate for modem sensibilities the
problem of moral responsibility that Aristotle himself fails to address. For if
it is true that the moral agent learns from many sources, rather than from one
tutor alone, then he or she is less subject to the misfortune of poor moral
instruction, for which he or she cannot be held responsible."t5
115 In adopting this neo-Aristotelean account of moral education, I do not wish to
minimize the extent to which it is problematic from a strictly Aristotelean point of view. For
example, equating the scope of moral education with the scope of moral practice obscures the
point at which one passes from the status of a moral student to that of a mature moral agent.
Aristotle places the accomplishment of this transition at the point of internalizing the
instructor's teachings, but such relative precision is impossible in the account presented here.
In fact, it follows from this account that the mature moral agent remains a moral student, an
idea that Aristotle would reject.
Nor would Aristotle endorse the idea that virtuous friends teach each other to be
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D. The Scope ofDeliberation
In simple terms, deliberation (boulesis) is the process through which
the virtuous moral agent, employing the intellectual virtue of phronesis,
chooses to undertake an action, or course of action, in order to accomplish
some end that conforms to the agent's character (hexeis). As a functional part
of the mechanics of virtue, deliberation is the distinctive feature of choice
that differentiates it from both wish and non-rational desire"'6 and, therefore,
makes a crucial contribution to the exercise of virtue and vice.
First and foremost, deliberation is an intensely practical undertaking.
According to Aristotle, we do not deliberate about the eternal and immutable,
or matters of necessity in the natural world, or things subject to chance, or
about matters already formulated by the sciences.11 7 We deliberate only
about human affairs that relate to us. For it makes sense to deliberate only
about things subject to our control and achievable through our action."
Therefore, choice "is a deliberate desire of things in our power.""'9 This
account of deliberation corresponds to that of political science as inexact, for
questions of appropriate human conduct are matters subject to rules that
generally hold true, but which lead to uncertain results in application. 20 One
must, in the course of deliberation, weigh alternative possibilities and
consider, insofar as one is able to do so, all the circumstances at work in a
given situation, to determine just which action will best achieve the end
desired.
Throughout his discussion of deliberation, and especially in Book
Three, Aristotle also portrays deliberation as a kind of rational calculation, or
virtuous, despite various references indicating the possibility of some mutual influence. By
definition, the roles of tutor and virtuous friend are mutually exclusive, since virtuous friends
are both virtuous, whereas tutor and student are not. Thus, Aristotle could not endorse an
account that requires the virtuous individual to be at once both student and friend of another.
However, the account offered here does not require that virtuous friends teach each other to be
virtuous in any systematic way. Hence, it may not be in conflict with Aristotle's own views,
insofar as Aristotle seems to distinguish between informal influence and systematic training.
116
Appetite (epithumia) is an element of desire (orexis) that is non-rational and
usually associated with gratification of bodily cravings. It leads to actions taken for the sake of
the pleasure they bring, not for the sake of the action, as being something good in itself.
However, vicious acts may also involve shrewd deliberation and choice, and therefore result
in blameworthiness. A virtuous choice must be the product of morally excellent deliberation,
i.e., deliberation about how to achieve some good that is an end in itself.
It is important to note that the difference between actions motivated by epithumia
and those involving virtuous choice does not consist in the object of desire, but in the
relationship of the desire to the human good. It would be perfectly fine for a virtuous man to
choose to indulge bodily cravings in a manner appropriate to his psyche, so long as he did so
in moderation, and so as not otherwise to distort his pursuit and achievement of that which is
good for a human being.
S11 l12a22 et seq.
"
1112a31.
n9
120

1113al1.
1112b9.
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instrumental thinking, engaged in selecting among alternative actions the one
most likely to achieve an end already specified. Thus, he states that "one
does not deliberate about the end, but about means towards the end."l 2' This
instrumental account of deliberation implies a conception of moral decisionmaking in which the specification of ends is entirely separate from the
identification of means. Thus, Aristotle states in Book Six that "virtue makes
the choice correct, but to do those things that it is necessary to do to achieve
the right end belongs not to virtue but to a different faculty."l 2 2
This account of deliberation as purely instrumental reasoning
ultimately lacks something in explanatory power. On any common-sense
account of moral life, individuals do not engage merely in isolated instances
of rational calculation in order to determine how to act to achieve static, prespecified ends. In fact, it is quite clear that Aristotle himself does not
understand deliberation exclusively in such simple terms. In analyzing
Aristotle's conception of deliberation, one must keep in mind the teleological
structure of the Ethics, especially Aristotle's assertion that the only end
chosen for its own sake is eudaimonia itself. Any other end chosen by the
virtuous moral agent is also a means to eudaimonia and, therefore, the
subject of deliberation.
Realization that what we normally take to be ends are also means
leads to a much broader account of the scope of deliberation and suggests
that moral excellence is not just a matter of hitting the mean in separate,
individual actions, though it is just that. More fundamentally it involves
choosing a life plan and hitting the mean in a vast number of interrelated
actions, as one seeks to realize that plan across the trajectory of many years'
experience. Within this process, the role of deliberation must be not only to
identify means, but to specify, co-ordinate, prioritize, and possibly revise
ends that together contribute to the achievement of eudaimonia.
In addition to the teleological structure of the Ethics, there is also
direct textual warrant for the conclusion that Aristotle does indeed endorse
this broader account of the scope of deliberation. He states in Book Six that
"it seems to be characteristic of a prudent man to be able to deliberate well
concerning that which is good and advantageous to himself, not in respect to
particular categories of good, such as what will lead to health or strength, but
in respect to those things that lead to a good life in general."l2 3 This passage
suggests that the morally virtuous person deliberates first about the ends that
contribute to or comprise eudaimonia, then about the specific means that
serve to achieve those general ends.
Another passage in Book Six leads to the same conclusion. Aristotle
states that
there is both unconditional good deliberation, and good
deliberation towards a particular end. The former leads
121

1112b34-35.

122

1144a20-23.

123

1140a25-28.
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towards the unconditional end, the latter is a particular form
of deliberative excellence leading to its particular end. If it is
characteristic of prudent men to have deliberated well, then
good deliberation must be a kind of correctness in
determining what is expedient as a means to the end, a true
conception of which constitutes prudence.12 4
Though admittedly somewhat confusing,1 25 this passage suggests that the
moral agent must deliberate at two levels, first selecting ends in relation to
the general end of living well, then choosing more particular ends and
actions to achieve his or her particular ends.126
To summarize, the moral agent deliberates not only about means, but
also about ends. Therefore, the agent must meditate not only upon general
principles applicable to categories of action that correspond to particular
moral virtues, for example, principles of magnanimous action, but also upon
principles of good life in general, i.e., what life a morally virtuous person
should pursue in order to achieve eudaimonia.However, even if deliberation
is responsible for the selection of ends that lead to eudaimonia,as well as the
selection of actions calculated to achieve those ends, moral character still has
an important role to play. For both the ends selected, and the conception of
moral excellence they reflect, are influenced by dispositions. The moral
student who learns to take pleasure in doing acts that are intrinsically good
will adopt ends calculated to achieve the supreme human good. Therefore, it
is no surprise that Aristotle emphasizes the inter-dependence of moral virtue
and deliberative excellence.127

1142b28-34.
There is some syntactic ambiguity in the last sentence because it isn't clear
whether the antecedent of "which" is "the end" or "correctness in determining what is
expedient." If it were the former, then this sentence would constitute an explicit statement that
good deliberation involves a true conception of the unconditional end, which is eudaimonia.
But this cannot be Aristotle's claim, since he asserts in Book Three that one deliberates only
about means.
126
In addition to these passages, several themes in the Ethics suggest the
appropriateness of understanding deliberation broadly as a process that applies to the adoption
of coordinated life plans rather than as an instrumental calculus applicable to individual
actions only. First, there is Aristotle's emphasis on the need for dispositions to be stable and
consistent, implying that virtue is not a matter of a single action. Second, there is Aristotle's
assertion that virtuous activity must occupy a complete lifetime. As we have seen, Aristotle's
meaning here is not so much that happiness is subject to fortune, but that happiness is the
product of an entire life well lived. In part, this is because only experience can provide the
deliberative capacity needed for complete virtue. However, the requirement also implies the
need for a life plan, in which virtue is found not just in single acts, but in a string of
interrelated acts.
127
1144a6-9; 1144b30-33. Moral virtue depends upon phronesis because its
realization in virtuous action depends upon excellent choice, and excellent choice is the
product of phronesis. (1 144b9-14). Phronesis in its turn depends upon moral virtue, because
without the guidance of virtuous dispositions it is merely cleverness, a capacity to calculate
well either bestowed by nature or learned by precept or experience. See supra note 113.
124
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E. Deliberation in the polis
The use of phronesis to identify ends and means that lead to
eudaimonia leads in turn to the codification or specification of general
principles of conduct. General principles of conduct are of particular interest
because they are by definition an attempt to establish rules of behavior not
just for oneself, but for everyone in the polis. They are not context-specific,
and reflect a belief that there is a normatively correct standard of behavior
applicable to all. In other words, there is in the process of deliberation and
the exercise of phronesis an inescapable element of concern not only with
oneself but with what is good for members of the polis in general.
Moreover, general principles of conduct are amenable to broader
universalization. Aristotle never claims or implies in the Ethics that the
process of deliberation or the derivation of general principles of virtuous
conduct apply beyond citizens of the Greek polis, but there is nothing to
preclude their extension in principle to all mankind. It is not possible, in
Aristotle's view, that Greeks should have one characteristic function, and
others (say Persians) another, since human beings comprise a single natural
kind.12 8 Therefore, the proper excellence of life in the Greek polis would in
principle be no different elsewhere. In recognition of this fact, the neoAristotelean interpretation of the Ethics advocated in this essay explicitly
adopts a non-parochial version of the mechanics of virtue, according to
which only children and those who are severely mentally handicapped are
exempt from Aristotle's standard of human excellence and, therefore, from
participation in the process of deriving (and abiding by) general principles of

virtuous conduct.12 9
Aristotle does recognize the political implications of deliberation in
his assertion that man is a political being, that eudaimonia is sought in
association with others, and that politics is therefore the master science of the
good. The natural human tendency to extrapolate from unique experience to
general principle is precisely what the science of politics is about. Aristotle
also takes note of the political dimension of deliberation in Book Six. He
states that phronesis is often thought to refer to wisdom concerned with
oneself, as an individual,O but that it actually includes also the function of
drafting decrees and general legislation,' 3 1 which is nothing less than an
effort to codify general principles of behavior. Here, Aristotle's thoughts
echo his statement in Book Two that lawgivers try to make the people good
by educating them in virtuous habits.
12s

1096a34-1096b2.

It should be noted that universalization of the mechanics of virtue, based on
natural, and therefore universal human characteristics, is a separate issue from universalization
of substantive norms derived from application of the mechanics in ethical choice-making.
While Aristotle's position justifies the former, it does not justify the latter. See supra text
accompanying notes 51-64.
130 1141b30-31.
... 1141b24-27,
129
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But how does politics harness deliberation to derive general political
principles? Aristotle assumes that general principles will come from a wise
lawgiver or lawgivers. However, Aristotle also recognizes that the
experiences of any individual or small group of individuals are partial,
incomplete, and limited in comparison with the accumulated experiences and
viewpoints of the whole political community. This latter concern seems to
suggest the advisability of a consensual form of decision-making, and
political friendship is the means whereby it becomes operational. More
specifically, it shall be argued presently that political friendship is the
particular virtue through which deliberation is harnessed in a consensual
process to the elaboration of general principles of political life, as one aspect
of virtuous life in general.
F. Friendship and Political Friendship
Aristotle's conception of friendship is very different from our own,
and far more comprehensive. According to Aristotle, every association or
relationship is a form of friendship, as long as it involves some kind of
common undertaking.132 All that is required is that friends wish each other's
good and be aware of the reciprocal nature of their goodwill. 133 Most
friendships are of a limited nature and are based on pleasure or simple
utility.134 The participants wish each other well only insofar as their mutual
utility or pleasure causes them to care about each other. Such friendships are
contingent, in that they are based on the accidental fact that the friends'
tastes or needs happen to bring them together. Limited friendships are broken
off easily. When it no longer affords pleasure or utility, the friendship is
dissolved, having existed only as a means to a particular end. 35
The complete or perfect form of friendship is based on the
unconditionally good, that which is inherently desirable.' 36 Perfect friends,
i.e., individuals who engage in the perfect or unconditional form of
friendship even if they are not perfect in any other way, are individuals
whose friendship is an end in itself, and therefore not accidental.' 37 In other
words, A, who loves the good, befriends B because B is good. Therefore, he
132

1159b27.

133

1156a3-4.

1155bl8-19.
1156al7-24.
136 Aristotle states that such "friendship is a virtue, or involves virtue." (1 155a2).
Thus, it is a fixed disposition, (1 157b29), noble in itself, (1 155a29), praiseworthy, (1 159a3334), and indispensable. ( 1155a29). Aristotle also asserts that the desire for friends is
instinctual, (1 155al7-20), but the achievement of virtue friendship, like that of any moral
virtue, requires the cultivation of the appropriate disposition.
Aristotle is unsure whether to regard friendship as a normative term, implying the
perfected, unconditional form of friendship. He suggests that the limited forms of friendship
are perhaps only friendships homonomously, (1 158b4-1 1), but treats them throughout Book
Eight as classes of friendship per se.
1'

13s

'

1156b6-12.
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befriends B for what B is, and wishes him well for his own sake. A derives
pleasure from the friendship because A loves and desires the good, but the
friendship is not instrumental. A does not enter the friendship in order to
derive pleasure or benefit from B. But because perfect friendship is good and
pleasant, both unconditionally and relatively (i.e., in relation to the friend), it
is the best form of friendship and naturally permanent.1
Aristotle states that friendship is the bond of the polis.'39 Therefore,
it is not surprising that he identifies political friendship as an important form
of perfect friendship. It is based on the friendly feeling of concord
(homonoia).140 In general, it motivates the lawgiver or lawgivers to seek the
good and common advantage of the polis.141 In more concrete terms, "cities
are said to be in harmony when they agree as to their interests, choose
policies to promote them, and do what seems correct to them in common."l42
In determining the scope of political friendship, it is important to
understand what Aristotle means by "common interest" (koinon). He states
that concord cannot exist among the bad, for they seek only their own
advantage rather than the common interest. They try to get more than their
share of advantages while avoiding public burdens. 14 3 This suggests that
political friendship involves, at a minimum, the just distribution of benefits
and burdens. In fact, Aristotle states explicitly that friendship and justice
share the same objects and personal relationships.1" Thus, "in every kind of
association there seems to be both justice and friendship."l 4 5
13
1156bl8-24. Aristotle also divides friendships into equal and unequal types.
Friendships are equal when both parties render the same benefit and wish the same good to
each other, or exchange different, but equal benefits. (1 158bl-4). Thus, perfect friendships are
equal by definition, though unequal friendships may also be virtuous when based on mutual
benefits reflecting the particular functional virtue of each party. (1 162a25-27).
139
1155a23.
140
1167b3.
141
1160al1-14.
142
1167a37-39. What level of political agreement does political friendship
require? Are citizens friends if they agree only on the need to seek consensus, or must they
actually agree on the policy to be pursued? Aristotle seems to suggest that virtuous citizens
will naturally agree with one another on political choices to be made, precisely because they
are all virtuous. (1167a26-28; 1167b5-8). However, Aristotle does not say or imply that such
agreement is a condition of virtuous political friendship, and from the standpoint of virtue
ethics it is best explicitly to adopt a separation between the virtue of political participation, as
an end in itself, and the achievement of any particular political outcome, at least under
conditions in which political agreement is difficult to achieve. See supra note 9 (especially last
paragraph). Hence the neo-Aristotelean version of political virtue offered here explicitly
adopts a conception of political friendship requiring only goodwill in commitment to a choicemaking procedure that takes account of all views presented.
143
11 67b9-13.
'4
1159b25-26.
145
1159b27. If every association partakes of justice, then justice of a fashion
obtains even when partners in crime split the burdens (risky assignments) and benefits (profits
from stolen goods) of their association in proportion to their relative contributions to it.
Although theft obviously does not partake of the virtue of justice in an unconditional sense,
nevertheless Aristotle would recognize the partners' agreement as partaking of justice in a
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On the other hand, political friendship seems to involve more than
the virtue of justice. Since it is a form of perfect friendship, it follows that
political friends wish the good for the object of their friendship. But in this
case the object of each friend is not another specific individual, but the
political community in general. If community life comprises more than the
fair distribution of benefits and burdens, then good individuals, as political
friends, must wish for a more comprehensive good than justice alone.
Aristotle suggests that comprehensive good is the aim of political friendship
in his claim that lawgivers aim to make the people good. On this reading,
political friendship aims at the complete eudaimoniaof all individuals within
the polis, through the development of general principles of what constitutes a
good life.146
Perfect friendship between individuals in general has an instrumental
value in preparing individuals for the specifically political version of that
friendship. Aristotle makes several arguments that the reciprocal sympathy
of good men is a source of goodness because it causes friends to treat each
other as "another self."1 4 7 Thus, the virtuous acts of our friends are as
pleasant to observe as our own and serve as a source of moral instruction
since we are better able to observe the excellent actions of our neighbors and
friends than our own.14 8 It is through this imaginative sympathy with the
experiences of his friends that the moral agent is able to extend the scope of
his own experience and obtain a more comprehensive understanding of the
community's good.
Even limited friendships are a useful source of training for political
friendship. Aristotle states that "all associations belong to the political
community." 49 In part, this is because both limited friendships and the polis
itself exist to secure advantage. But it is also true that such relationships are a
source of moral experience. The friends in such relationships do not exercise
the kind of imaginative sympathy that is characteristic of perfect friendship,
yet they can compare the attitudes and actions of others to their own, causing
them to confirm or revise their own views accordingly. The particular
relative, or conditional, sense.
146
Aristotle also notes that the claims of justice vary according to the nature of the
relationship. The nearer the relationship, the greater the claims of justice. (l 160a2-5). Thus, if
justice is an important factor in political friendship, then political friendship must be a near
relationship. In that case, it seems likely that political friends are also concerned with one
another's good in general.
147

1l66a32.

1169b34-1170a4. There are a variety of ways in which Aristotle indicates
friendship is an important, if informal, source of moral education. First,
that
perfect
explicitly
he states that a virtuous friend must try to "set right" a friend who has developed vicious
tendencies before abandoning the friendship. (1 165b 16). Second, he states that "good people's
life together allows the cultivation of virtue . . . ." (l l70al 1). Third, he states that virtuous
friends "become still better from their activities and their mutual correction." (1172al0).
Fourth, he makes the same point by negative implication, in his claim that immoral people,
"by becoming similar to each other . .. grow more vicious." (1172a9).
148

149

1160a8.
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intellectual virtue that accomplishes this is comprehension (sunesis), a virtue
similar to phronesis, but which involves the use of opinion to judge the
results of others' deliberations.'"s One might then say that the function of
sunesis, within the context of political life, is to assimilate the experiences of
others to the derivation of general rules of conduct. Therefore, sunesis has an
important role to play in moral education generally, as well as in the
development of political friendship.
G. Political Virtue and the Logic of Consensual Decision-Making
The role of political friendship, or political virtue, as it may be called
when practiced in an excellent manner, implies the adoption of some
consensual form of decision-making in the polis, with respect to the
codification of compulsory general rules of conduct, i.e., laws. This follows
from the fact that political virtue is an instance of virtue generally, and that
all the observations about moral education and practice therefore apply to it.
First, consensual decision-making is implied by the fact that political
activity. Purely intellectual virtues, such as theoria, are
involves
virtue
manifested in activity of the soul alone, but moral virtues require an activity
of the soul (deliberation) combined with a choice that issues in an action of
some sort. General principles of political life are the product of this latter
process, issuing in the active choice of rules, or laws, to govern conduct in
the polis. Eudaimonia, the supreme good for human beings, is achieved
through virtuous activity. Therefore, if the moral agent is deprived of an
opportunity to engage in virtuous activity, he or she is deprived, to the extent
of that deprivation, of the opportunity to achieve eudaimonia (insofar as the
activity is virtuous activity). Since the codification of general principles of
conduct is a kind of virtuous activity involving the moral virtues, members of
the polis must have an opportunity to engage in active choice-making in
order to achieve eudaimoniawith respect to that type of virtuous activity.
Second, consensual decision-making is implied by the fact that
moral practice is the source of moral education. On the neo-Aristotelean
account of moral education, moral agents continue to improve their virtue
throughout their lives. Though their dispositions may be determined at an
early age through habituation, moral agents at the very least continue to
improve their deliberative capacity as they face myriad factual contexts
requiring correct appraisal. Thus, even the moral choices of mature adults
with stable characters constitute a kind of continuing education. As they face
new situations, or receive guidance from new sources through the faculty of
sunesis, they must reassess their beliefs about how they should act in pursuit
of a well-lived life. Friendships of all kinds provide much of the context in
which moral agents continue to learn and apply their virtue. Political
friendship is the means through which members of the polis continue to
150

1143a12-17.
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sharpen their ability to discern and articulate appropriate general principles
of conduct suitable for codification. To be deprived of the opportunity to
practice political virtue not only curtails the opportunity to achieve
eudaimonia, but also to sharpen the deliberative capacity upon which
political virtue rests.
Third, consensual decision-making is implied by the fact that the
experiences of any given individual are inevitably limited. This is especially
critical with respect to matters that are not strictly personal, but are of
interest to the entire polis. For if a person is limited in judging matters that
affect himself alone, so much the more must this be so in judging matters
that potentially affect large numbers of people. Discerning the common good
requires assessment of a larger and more complex set of circumstances, some
of which must by necessity be less known to, or appreciated by, one citizen
than another. Therefore, the general principles of conduct codified in
legislation will be satisfactory only if they reflect the combined wisdom of
all virtuous members of the community. General principles must somehow
overcome the partial and incomplete experiences of even the most virtuous
individuals. Political friendship, effected through some form of consensual
decision-making process, has a particular role to play in combining the
virtuous wisdom of all.
This view of the importance of political friendship in usefully
combining the views of the many is supported by Aristotle's own conclusion
that the perspective of even a morally excellent person is limited. This
conclusion is implicit in his views on moral education and friendship. Thus,
he claims that it is fitting for friends to spend time together.'"' Virtuous
friends "seem to become still better from their joint activities and mutual
give him
correction. For each moulds the other in respect to those things15that
2
pleasure, whence the saying 'of noble men come noble deeds"'
Given the high interpersonal demands placed on perfect friends in
general, one might object that consensual decision-making among political
friends, as presented here, could function only in poleis, or possibly in other
very small-scale communities. Aristotle does indeed assert that perfect
friendship in general is rare and requires time and intimacy to flourish.'
However, Aristotle imposes no such condition on political friendship
specifically. The latter is a form of perfect friendship because it obtains only
between fellow citizens who are virtuous. But it imposes no obligation of
intimacy as a pre-condition to effective operation.154 It requires only that one
1171b30-1172al4.
1172al2-14.
"' 1156b25-29.
154 Aristotle's position on the status of political friendship qua friendship is
somewhat ambivalent. Political friendship is based on concord (homonoia). See supra text
accompanying note 140. Homonoia is a form of friendly feeling (philikon), (1 167a22), as is
goodwill (eunoia). (1 166b30). But eunoia is not a form of friendship because it can be felt
towards strangers, whereas friendship requires reciprocal feelings. (l 155b31-1156al;
1166b30-32). This suggests that philikon and homonoia might not be forms of friendship
151
152
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wish and act for the good of the community for its own sake.' 55 In fact,
insofar as one cannot know the whole community with any degree of
interpersonal intimacy, even in small-scale poleis, political friendship by
definition forecloses the kind of relationship between individuals that perfect
friendship in general presupposes. Perfect friendship, and all other forms of
friendship as well, affect the character and degree of virtue with which the
member of the polis views questions of public interest, but the intimacy of
perfect friendship in general is not a part of addressing such questions or
forming general principles of conduct. Therefore, the large scale of modem
political society does not, in principle, preclude consensual decision-making,
through the medium of political friendship, from consideration as a plausible
account of the best method of political decision-making even in the modem
state.
III.
A. Introduction
According to the theory of political virtue offered in Part II, citizens
of the polis engage in a consensual process to codify appropriate general
principles of conduct for themselves as a community. They do so through the
medium of political friendship, a form of perfect or unconditional friendship,
in which citizens desire and act to achieve the good of the community and
take pleasure from their membership in a community that is well ordered.
either, for the same reason. On the other hand, Aristotle says that eunoia is the beginning of
friendship, (1167a4-5), or inactive friendship that may become active friendship with time and
intimacy. (l 167al 1-14). Thus, it is not surprising that Aristotle describes homonoia as
political friendship (philia politikei). (l1l67b3). These somewhat conflicting statements lead
most sensibly to the view that Aristotle regards homonoia as the functional equivalent of
perfect friendship (and therefore a virtue) in the context of political life, even though it does
not strictly meet all the requirements of friendship.
155 This follows from the definition of perfect, or unconditional, friendship in
general. (1 155b31-32).
156 The argument here is that the mechanics of virtue can be translated to largescale political communities. A different question is whether such translation is sensible, even
if possible. Richard Kraut notes that, as a matter of formal definition, "differences in size do
not by themselves constitute differences in kind." KRAUT, supra note 44, at 13. Formally
speaking, Aristotle defines the polis as "a certain number of citizens." (Pol. 1274b41).
Citizens still exist, and modem states have a certain number of them; so such states qualify as
poleis under Aristotle's definition. More to the point, "The polis and the modem state are
kindred institutions, because they must confront kindred predicaments, having to do with the
distribution of power and wealth and the proper ends to which these resources should be put."
KRAUT, supra note 44, at 13-14. I agree with Kraut's conclusion in general, but not with the
possible inference from his remark that the predicaments of political life focus exclusively, or
even just principally, on matters of political justice. For as the master science of the good,
political science aims at the comprehensive well-being of the citizens, not just in matters
relating to the virtue of justice. In other words, it is not a specialized skill, such as
horsemanship or generalship, but a skill that relates to the achievement of well-being in
general.

POLITICAL VIRTUE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

2011]

299

Through participation in a deliberative and consensual process, citizens of
the polis engage in a form of virtuous activity that contributes, in part, to
their achievement of eudaimonia.
Part III now considers what implication this theory of political virtue
might have for the institution of judicial review. In general terms, political
friendship implies a widespread consensual or mutually consultative form of
decision-making as the method of operationalizing political virtue for the
largest number of citizens and as the best method for achieving satisfactory
results in the choice of appropriate, binding general rules of conduct.
Therefore, to the extent that judicial review precludes or overrides such
decision-making, it seems to be incompatible with political virtue. This
assertion does not imply a link between political virtue and any specific form
of democracy, but it does push in a generally democratic direction.
After critiquing judicial review in a preliminary fashion, Part III will
consider two democratic arguments in favor of the practice. The first is an
empirical argument that judicial review demonstrably responds to the public
will and is, therefore, not only compatible with democracy, but is an integral
part of it as practiced in pluralist democracies, such as the United States.'
The second is a normative argument that judicial review, exercised on the
basis of an originalist form of interpretation, follows from the logic of
popular sovereignty underlying the Constitution. 158 The argument asserts that
an originalist form of judicial review, properly understood, reinforces
popular sovereignty, and therefore democracy. The purpose of rehearsing
these arguments is to examine, in a more extended and comprehensive way,
whether, and to what extent, judicial review is incompatible with the neoAristotelean theory of political virtue.159
157

See infra Part II.C-D.

s

See infra Part II.E.

159 These arguments are democratic in the strong sense that they view judicial

review as embodying popular will. Other arguments defending judicial review are democratic
in a weak sense. They understand judicial review as counter-majoritarian, but defend it insofar
as it enhances or reinforces democracy more broadly. In his now classic work, John Hart Ely
interpreted the Constitution purely as a procedural blueprint for democracy and justified
judicial review as a means of correcting imperfections of democracy in fact. See generally
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw (1980). In more
recent years a renascent version of republicanism has justified judicial review as a means of
reinforcing the reasoned deliberation, as opposed to interest group pluralism, of democratic
politics. See generally CASS SuNsTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993). Both of these
arguments view judicial review as a necessary adjunct to democracy, but not itself a
democratic practice.
Most contemporary justifications of judicial review are rights-based theories,
explicitly anti-democratic in their conclusion that majorities should be trumped by judicial
decisions whenever majorities place impermissible burdens on non-voidable rights. These
justifications form a line of argument descending from Alexander Bickel. See generally
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS (1962). Bickel argued that government of "the good society" has two distinct
functions: "to satisfy the immediate needs of the greatest number," and "to support and
maintain enduring general values." Id. at 27. The former function is the province of the
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B. The Neo-Aristotelean Critique of Judicial Review
According to Aristotle, virtuous action requires discernment of
relevant circumstances by an agent with properly trained dispositions.
Through the application of phronesis, the agent then determines which
action, under the relevant circumstances, will best serve the agent's ends.
Phronesis operates through the device of the practical syllogism and
legislator, but the latter function calls for "a habit of mind, and for undeviating institutional
customs" characteristic of courts and judges, who "have ... the leisure, the training, and the
insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of government." Id. at 23-28.
Bickel claimed to be seeking a principled justification of judicial review, but conceded that
"[w]e cannot know whether . . . our legislatures are what they are because we have judicial
review, or whether we have judicial review and consider it necessary because legislatures are
what they are." Id. at 25. He therefore linked the justification of judicial review to a stipulated
set of circumstances, without inquiring into the question of whether those alleged
circumstances are contingent and local, or a necessary feature of democratically chosen
legislatures.
Among contemporary writers, the most significant descendant of Bickel is Ronald
Dworkin. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM's LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996). Dworkin rejects the "majoritarian premise" in favor of a
"constitutional conception of democracy," according to which the defining aim of democracy
is that "collective decisions be made by political institutions whose structure, composition,
and practices treat all members of the community, as individuals, with equal concern and
respect." Id. at 17. Dworkin concedes that "it may be controversial what the democratic
conditions, in detail, really are, and whether a particular law does offend them. But, according
to the constitutional conception, it would beg the question to object to a practice assigning
those controversial questions for final decision to a court, on the ground that the practice is
undemocratic, because that objection assumes that the laws in question respect the democratic
conditions, and that is the very issue in controversy." Id. at 18. Dworkin's main point is that
the principle of treating people with equal concern and respect outweighs (and often
contradicts the results of) any procedural principle favoring legislative decision-making.
However, it bears pointing out that Dworkin's observation harbors a basic confusion. In fact,
even within Dworkin's constitutional conception of democracy, it does not necessarily beg the
question to object to the assignment of controversial questions to the Supreme Court, since the
issue in controversy would, in that case, not be whether the "laws in question" respect
democratic conditions, but whether the Supreme Court is the institution "whose structure,
composition, and practices" are best suited to determine whether or not they do. Id. Dworkin
would doubtlessly reply that the two questions are the same, i.e., that to reject judicial review
in favor of an alternative, presumably democratic, procedure as the proper basis to evaluate
the compatibility of an enactment with "democratic conditions" implies that the
democratically enacted legislation, by definition, meets those conditions in the first place, the
very assumption in question. Id. But this reply ignores the possibility of a democratic review
procedure subsequent to enactment, such as reconsideration by the same, or a different,
democratically elected body. Thus, it is Dworkin who begs the question of the suitability of
judicial review, by assuming that there is no conceivable alternative form of review.
Obviously rights-based justifications of judicial review are antithetical to the
consensualism favored by the neo-Aristotelean theory of political virtue. Therefore, there is
little insight to be gained from an analysis of these theories concerning the compatibility of the
neo-Aristotlean theory with judicial review. To a lesser extent, this is also true with respect to
the weakly democratic theories mentioned above. If the neo-Aristotelean theory of political
virtue is found incompatible with strongly democratic arguments for judicial review, there is
little hope that it will be found compatible with these less democratic arguments.
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therefore involves the application of principles of action, which themselves
are extrapolated through a process of generalization across a variety of
analogous sets of circumstances. To illustrate through a simple example, let
us suppose that a properly trained moral agent wishes to acknowledge in
some fashion the help of a benefactor. In accordance with the general rule
that one should show gratitude through a small, but appropriate, token of
acknowledgment, the agent might purchase an amusing tie if he or she knows
that his or her benefactor especially likes such ties, but might choose instead
just to write a note, if he or she knows that his or her benefactor is
embarrassed by gifts.160

This example illustrates the mechanics of virtue in its simplest, most
instrumental form. However, phronesis and the deliberative process are
employed not only to determine how to achieve short-term goals, but also
much more broadly to determine what kind of life will lead to eudaimonia.
Within this larger enterprise, the role of political virtue is to articulate those
general rules of living well deemed sufficiently fundamental to the
achievement of eudaimonia to merit codification as mandatory norms of
conduct in the polis.
In the United States, judicial review is one of the most critical
processes, if not the most critical process, through which this larger task of
political virtue is carried out, for it often involves both the articulation and
application of such broad, fundamental principles. In order to determine the
constitutionality of enacted legislation, reviewing courts must apply very
general, value-laden constitutional clauses, such as the Due Process Clause,
the Equal Protection Clause, or the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and
unusual punishment," to legislation challenged under a specific set of
circumstances. Since these clauses of the Constitution are not self-executing,
their application (in the absence of a mechanical interpretive strategy, such
as originalism or adherence to the surface meaning of the language) requires
the use of phronesis to determine their meaning and scope. The result in a
given case is a constitutional norm applicable to a generalized or categorical
description of the facts presented.
Of course this may, and often does, result in the explicit override of
democratically enacted legislation. To cite one recent example, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court voided a statutory ban on single-sex
marriage, stating that only a "destructive stereotype" could motivate such a
statute, working "a deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of the
16
In reality, one supposes that the various processes that occur within the
mechanics of virtue are interrelated, overlapping, and even simultaneous. Thus, the moral
agent discerns, through nous, that his benefactor's penchant for funny ties is a relevant fact,
just because of the applicable general principle that one should show gratitude by giving a
small gift. In its turn, the general principle is itself the product of (past instances of) the use of
phronesis, as is the agent's recognition of the principle's applicability to the facts of this
situation. Nevertheless, the operations of nous and phronesis remain analytically distinct
elements of the mechanics of virtue.
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community."' 6 ' The court concluded that the limitation of the availability of
marriage to opposite-sex couples violated both a fundamental liberty interest
of the Massachusetts Constitution's Due Process Clause and could not
possibly serve any legitimate public purpose under Massachusetts's Equal

Protection Clause.162
Alternatively, a reviewing court may defer to legislative judgment.
Thus, the Washington Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the Washington
Constitution's Privileges and Immunities Clause does not grant a
fundamental right to marry a person of the same sex. 63 The court also held
that the limitation of the availability of marriage only to opposite-sex couples
through the Washington Defense of Marriage Act is rationally related to
legitimate purposes, namely the encouragement of procreation and the
cultivation of the most advantageous home environment for the rearing of
children.' 6" Granting a presumption of constitutionality to the challenged
statute, the Washington Supreme Court relied in part on the assertion that
fundamental liberty interests exist only if those interests are "objectively,
deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition .

.

. and implicit in the

concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.", 6 1 In like fashion, the court deferred to the legislature's
finding that the challenged statute (and the classifications it created)
reasonably promoted an end within the scope of legitimate state action.
Making the opposite presumption, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
stated that statutes constraining liberty must "bear[] a real and substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase of the
general welfare." 6 7
At bottom, these courts disagreed about three interrelated things:
whether the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging a particular home
environment for the rearing of children; whether the statutes created
classifications that discriminated against a vulnerable group; and whether the
right to marry anyone, regardless of gender, is a fundamental liberty interest.
All of these matters involved the use of phronesis in the interpretation and
application of very general norms (liberty and equal protection) to determine
the legitimacy of a more specific norm (the legality of prohibiting same-sex
marriage). In setting aside a statutory ban on single-sex marriage, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court obviously overrode the people's
conception of what constitutes virtuous conduct leading to eudaimonia,
manifested in the adoption of the overruled statute. In contrast, the
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962, 968 (Mass. 2003).
162
Id. at 968.
163 Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 976-79 (Wash. 2006).
'64
Id at 985.
165
Id. at 976 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
'6
Id. at 990.
167
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960 (alteration in original) (quoting Coffee-Rich,
Inc. v. Comm'r Pub. Health, 204 N.E.2d 281, 287 (Mass. 1965)).
161
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Washington Supreme Court applied norms advanced through a more or less
inchoate consensual process. In so doing, it sought to defer to, rather than
preempt, the judgment rendered democratically by the citizens through their
legislature. However, the Washington Supreme Court's deference resulted
from its own first-order analysis of the issues. Therefore, like the
Massachusetts court, the Washington court effectively substituted its own
judgment for that of the citizens expressed in the reviewed statute.
According to Aristotle, morally significant conduct is a form of
action that operationalizes various elements of the psyche, i.e., hexeis, orexis,
nous, and phronesis, in such a way that the agent is able to achieve his or her
final end as a human being.16 8 From the Aristotelean point of view, judicial
review in both cases impeded the development and practice of political virtue
by curtailing its opportunity for decisive political action. It is true that in
each case the legislature acted before review occurred. However, in
Massachusetts, the court voided the effect of the legislature's deliberation by
overriding the statute that resulted from it and impeded its future practice and
development by insulating the subject matter of the statute from any further
political consideration. In Washington, the Supreme Court neither voided the
result of legislative deliberation, nor removed the topic from future political
consideration. Nevertheless, in making the final decision, the Washington
Supreme Court supplanted the legislature and the efficacy of its legislation.
If constitutional decisions such as these were subject to further
political deliberation and revision, i.e., if they constituted a weak rather than
strong version of judicial review, they would perhaps be compatible with the
neo-Aristotelean theory of political virtue. In the first place, they would
then be corrigible. This is a significant advantage from the neo-Aristotelean
standpoint, given its focus on the necessary limitations of any individual's or
small group's experiences as the foundation for the codification of general
rules of conduct. In the second place, the very possibility of further political
review would, by definition, implicate the citizens' political judgment, for
they would have to choose either to revise or uphold the result of the
decision. Even acquiescence in a decision would constitute morally
significant action, i.e., a choice to accept its consequences as preferable to
the voided statute, or as preferable to working to re-enact the voided statute,
or simply as preferable to paying any further attention.
In theory, political control of even strong judicial review is made
possible, as a matter of constitutional design, through the process of
constitutional amendment. Through this process the polity is given an
See generally supra Part II.C and accompanying notes.
According to Miguel Schor, American judicial review is atypically strong,
of being the first form of constitutional judicial review to develop; some of
a
result
as
partly
the more recent incarnations have tried to avoid the political consequences flowing from the
American version by building some possibility for political correction into the review
procedure. See generally Miguel Schor, Judicial Reiew and American Constitutional
Exceptionalism, 46 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 535 (2008).
168
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opportunity directly to repeal the effect of an unwelcome constitutional
decision through alteration of the constitution's text. However, at least under
the U.S. Constitution, the amendment process fails to fulfill this promise
because the mechanics of amendment impose a disproportionate burden on
those who wish to alter a constitution's meaning.170 The various methods of
amendment are intentionally difficult in order to promote stability in
fundamental principles and to avoid cluttering the Constitution with overly
specific language intended to solve transient political problems.171 Moreover,
given that judicial review itself is not entrenched in the text of the U.S.
Constitution, it follows that constitutional amendment was not foreseen or
intended by the Constitution's drafters as a means of redressing errant
judicial review. Since judicial review affects a constitution's meaning
through interpretation of its language rather than alteration of the text,
procedural symmetry suggests the logic of some corresponding political
method of reviewing such interpretations without having to alter the
language interpreted. Otherwise, those who wish to overturn a constitutional
decision are left with a cumbersome and inaccessible instrument that
overcompensates for the problem perceived to be in need of solution.
One such political method of review is the so-called legislative
override, which permits legislatures to re-enact legislation previously held
unconstitutional. A well known example is the the "notwithstanding clause"
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.172 This provision affords an
170 The procedures for amendment under the U.S. Constitution are governed
by
Article V. There are two possibilities: either (1) two thirds of both houses of Congress shall
adopt a proposed amendment, or (2) Congress shall call a convention for the consideration of
proposed amendments at the request of two thirds of the state legislatures. U.S. CONST. art. V.
In either case, ratification requires formal adoption by either the legislatures or conventions of
three quarters of the states. Procedures for amendment of state constitutions vary from state to
state.
171 According to political scientist Donald Lutz, "[T]he U.S. Constitution is the
most difficult [constitution in the world] to amend." Donald Lutz, Toward a Formal Theory
and Practice of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). According

to Sanford Levinson, "Article V makes it next to impossible to amend the Constitution with

respect to genuinely controversial issues, even if substantial-and intense-majorities
advocate amendment." SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 21 (2006)
(citing Lutz, supra). One consequence of the difficulty of amendment is that courts might feel
justified in filling the void with increased judicial invention. See generally Anne Twomey,
ConstitutionalAlteration and the High Court: the Jurisprudence of Justice Callinan, 27 U.
QUEENSL. L.J. 47 (2008).
172
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 c. 11 (Can.)
art. 33. Under this article, either the national Parliament or any provincial legislature "may
expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act
or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or
sections 7 to 15 of this Charter." Sections 2 and 7-15 list various "fundamental freedoms" and
"legal rights," respectively. "Democratic rights" protected by sections 3-5 are thus excluded
from the operation of this override power. A sunset provision requires that statutory overrides
of rights contained in sections 2 and 7-15 be re-enacted every five years. Constitution Act,
1982, art. 33 subd. 3
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interesting alternative to the axiomatic view that the existence of a written
constitution, containing binding and not just aspirational norms, entails a
judicial monopoly on the determination of its application. By granting
override power to the legislature, this solution partially embeds the
application of constitutional principles in the political process.173
Another interesting attempt to reconcile legislative and judicial roles
in the elaboration of general norms can be found in the several human rights
acts adopted by various jurisdictions of the British Commonwealth. These
acts represent an effort to introduce textually entrenched rights into politicallegal systems that share a tradition of parliamentary supremacy. Thus, they
differ in purpose somewhat from the legislative override, which is a method
of limiting strong judicial review in jurisdictions which already have
Article 33 was intended as a method of overturning the effect of judicial decisions,
but in most instances has in fact been used preemptively to immunize legislation from
anticipated judicial review. The Qudbec government was the first to employ article 33. In Bill
62 (1982), it amended all in-force Qudbec statutes to include a notwithstanding clause, and
then inserted a standard notwithstanding clause in every legislative enactment from 1982 to
1985. See Michel Bastarache, Section 33 and the Relationship Between Legislatures and
Courts, 14 CONST. F. 1 (2005); see also Howard Leeson, Section 33, The Notwithstanding
Clause: A Paper Tiger?, in JUDICIAL POWER AND CANADIAN DEMOCRACY 297, 313-15 (Paul
Howe & Peter H. Russell eds., 2001). For a comprehensive review of legislative action under
article 33, see generally Colloquy, CharterDialogue: Ten Years Later, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J.
1 (2007).
The article 33 power to enact non-compliant legislation is a safety valve that comes
into play only if the legislation in question does not pass muster under a separate general
limitation clause contained in article 1. This article states that "the rights and freedoms set out
in [the Charter] [are] subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." Constitution Act, 1982, art. 1. A
possible problem lurks in the question of whether the scope of article 1 includes article 33.
Presumably the "reasonable limits" of article I are in accord with the Charter, and therefore
the article I requirement of reasonableness does not apply to statutes enacted under article 33
"notwithstanding" the content of the Charter's rights-granting articles. To read the article 1
requirement as applying to article 33 would essentially read article 33 out of the Charter
altogether and defeat its purpose, i.e., to preserve parliamentary supremacy.
173 Israel has also adopted a very limited form of legislative override in the context
of its Basic Law, a quasi-constitutional statute that the Supreme Court has been empowered to
use to nullify other legislation. In 1992 the Knesset adopted an amendment to the Basic Law,
entitled Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1992, S.H. 114. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme
Court held in Meatreal v. Prime Minister, HCJ 3872/93 [1993] IsrSC 47(5) 485, that under
this Basic Law the government could not legally prohibit the importation of non-kosher meat.
In response, the Knesset adopted a new Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1994, S.H. 90,
with a section stating that "[a] provision of a Law that violates freedom of occupation shall be
of effect . . . if it has been included in a Law passed by a majority of the members of the
Knesset, which expressly states that it shall be of effect, notwithstanding the provisions of this
Basic Law." The Knesset then immediately adopted the Import of Frozen Meat Law, 1994,
S.H. 104, banning the importation of non-kosher frozen meat. This statute was then upheld by
the Supreme Court in Meatreal v. Knesset, HCJ 4676/94 [1997] IsrSC 50(5) 15. For a
discussion of this sequence of legislation, see Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Case for
Legislative Override, 10 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 250, 259-61 (2005). The non-

compliant Israeli statute must be re-enacted every four years. Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, 1994, S.H. 90 subd. 8.
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entrenched constitutional rights.17 4
Judicial review of legislation under human rights statutes is
declaratory in nature, i.e., courts do not have power to set aside statutes
found to be inconsistent with human rights norms. Parliamentary supremacy
remains undisturbed, and inconsistent statutes remain in force subject to noncompulsory legislative revision. Therefore, review does not trigger a possible
legislative override, as it does in Canada, where a finding of incompatibility
is fatal to the challenged statute, subject only to (prospective) re-enactment.
Moreover, inconsistent statutes are not subject to sunset provisions, as are
legislative overrides in Canada.
Human rights acts are a problematic compromise between judicial
review and parliamentary supremacy for two reasons. First, although
intended only to give courts a limited, advisory role in the elaboration of
basic rights, their application has upset the relationship between courts and
legislatures in unexpected and unintended ways. The result may undermine,
rather than preserve, parliamentary supremacy.17 5 Second, human rights acts
174
New Zealand and the United Kingdom both have human rights acts. Neither of
these jurisdictions has a written constitution with entrenched rights (as Canada now does) but
instead enacted statutory protection of fundamental rights. E.g., Human Rights Act 1998
(U.K.) (incorporating rights created under the European Convention on Human Rights into the
municipal law of the U.K.); Bill of Rights Act 1990 (N.Z.). In addition to New Zealand and
Great Britain, both the Australian state of Victoria and the Australian Capitol Territory have
adopted their own human rights acts. CharterofHuman Rights and ResponsibilitiesAct, 2006
(Vic.) (Austl.) [hereinafter Victorian Charter]; Human Rights Act 2004 (A.C.T.) (Austi.). So
far as it is within the jurisdiction of the State of Victoria to do so, the Victorian Charter is
designed to incorporate into the law of Victoria the human rights norms contained in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966). The Victorian
Charter also incorporates elements of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, tracking
article I of the Canadian Charter when it states that protected rights are subject "to such
reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom . . . ." Victorian Charter § 7(2). Moreover, in a manner
analogous to that of the Canadian "notwithstanding clause," section 31(1) empowers the
Victorian Parliament to declare expressly that an Act of Parliament will operate despite its
incompatibility with a right protected by the Charter. Id. § 31(1). However, since a judicial
"declaration of incompatible application" is purely advisory in its effect, there is no need for
Parliamentary declarations under section 31(1), and the existence of this provision is curious.
175
For example, in the U.K., a post-Human Rights Act common law rule of
interpretation has developed, according to which inconsistent later statutes cannot repeal
provisions of a "constitutional statute" by implication. See Thoburn v. Sunderland City
Council [2002] EWHC (Admin) 195, [2003] Q.B. 151 (Eng.). Since "constitutional statute[s]"
are those that "condition the legal relationship between citizen and state in some general,
overarching manner or enlarge[] or diminish[] the scope of what we would now regard as
fundamental constitutional rights," it seems clear that Parliament could no longer alter the
scope of European Convention rights incorporated into domestic law by the Human Rights
Act without an express statement to that effect in a later statute. Id. at 186 (defining
"constitutional stautes"). This requirement is problematic in that it may require Parliament to
anticipate the manner in which courts might subsequently determine that its statutes violate
the substantive provisions of the Human Rights Act. Ambiguity arises from the imprecision of
the Thoburn court's test of what constitutes express repeal. The court held that "the test could
only be met by express words in the later statute, or by words so specific that the inference of
an actual determination to effect the result contended for was irresistible." Id. at 187.
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However, it is unclear whether the specificity required relates to the specific effect found
objectionable or requires merely a specific expression of intent to override the constitutional
statute in question, or any constitutional statute, regardless of any specific effect at issue in
subsequent litigation, or whether either of these would be sufficient independently. In any
event, should Parliamentary repeal in subsequent legislation be found insufficiently express or
specific, a court may in fact strike down the offending statute under the Thoburn rule, subject
to re-enactment with the required override language. Since declarations of incompatibility
under the Human Rights Act itself are purely advisory, the operation of the Thoburn rule, as
an alternative to any such declaration, would obviously undermine the remedial structure of
the Human Rights Act.
Equally surprising, and perhaps more significant, is the fact that the power to issue
non-binding declarations of incompatibility has been completely eclipsed in its impact by the
obligation typically imposed on reviewing courts by human rights acts to interpret challenged
statutes in a manner that conforms to applicable human rights norms, if possible. See, e.g.,
Human Rights Act (U.K.) § 3. Section 3 of the Human Rights Act imposes on the judiciary an
obligation to interpret English legislation in a manner that renders it consistent with the
European Convention on Human Rights, "[s]o far as it is possible to do so." This injunction is
qualitatively different from the general common law obligation courts are under to interpret
ambiguous statutory language, in that the interpretive requirement does not specifically
depend upon statutory ambiguity to trigger it. Moreover, the Thoburn requirement, that
derogations from "constitutional" norms be made explicitly, forces courts to ignore the plain
intent of statutory language when the intention to override Convention rights is not expressly
articulated. Thoburn, [2003] Q.B. at 187. Thus, applying section 3 of the Human Rights Act in
conjunction with the Thoburn rule, courts may significantly alter the meaning of reviewed
legislation. As one commentator has observed,
If section 3 permits a UK court to read into every provision of
every Act a qualification that "nothing in this provision shall operate in a
way that would be incompatible with a Convention right," . . . [then]
section 3 permits judicial invalidation, in the guise of interpretation, of
Acts of the UK Parliament that are clearly incompatible with Convention
rights.
Robert Wintemute, The Human Rights Act's FirstFive Years: Too Strong, Too Weak, or Just
Right?, 17 KINGS C. L.J. 209, 214 (2006) (quoting Human Rights Act (U.K.) § 3). In fact, the
Judicial Committee of the House of Lords applied this directive very broadly in 2004 to hold
that the phrase "surviving spouse" in the Rent Act of 1977 must be read to include the
survivor of a single-sex couple, in order to give same-sex partners the same rights to take over
a protected tenancy as the survivor of a married or cohabiting heterosexual couple. See
Ghaiden v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] A.C. 557 (appeal taken from Eng.).
Given the plain meaning of the term "spouse," this amounted to a very significant amendment
to the Rent Act. It remains to be seen whether the new U.K. High Court will continue to apply
section 3 in such broad terms. At least one commentator views the section 3 obligation as
giving courts a power analogous to the "principle of legality," but stronger and likely to
become increasingly influential. See generally Philip Sales, A Comparison of the Principleof
Legality and Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998, 125 L.Q. REv. 598 (2009). "Under the
principle of legality, the interpretation of statutory provisions is modified to take account of
background rights or interests judged to be fundamental in some way, and which are not
distinctly overridden by Parliament by the words used in the statute." Id at 598. But "[i]n
relation to individual human rights, the [Human Rights Act] provides the better defined and
stronger protection and is likely in practice largely to eclipse the principle of legality." Id. at
615. Clause 6 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act includes the same directive, and section
32 of the Victorian Charter obligates courts to interpret challenged statutes in a manner
compatible with protected rights, though only if they may be so interpreted "consistently with
their statutory purpose." Bill of Rights Act (N.Z.), cl 6; Victorian Charter § 32. Otherwise,
courts must issue a non-binding "declaration of inconsistent application" under section 36.
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(and also the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) have elicited a
substantial literature asserting their value in encouraging constitutional
dialog between legislatures and courts, but the nature, scope, and value of
any such dialog remains unclear. 176 In the end, even if such provisions
Finally, the Human Rights Act has become a foundation upon which some judges
and commentators have sought to erect the quite novel doctrine of "common law
constitutionalism." According to this doctrine, Parliamentary supremacy is the product of
common law, and can therefore be limited by common law. It therefore asserts the existence
of broad power inherent in the common law to subject Parliamentary acts to general principles
enunciated by courts. This doctrine was explicitly endorsed by the Justices in R. (on the
application of Jackson) v. Att'y Gen., [2005 UKHL] H.L. 56 (Eng.). However, most judges
and commentators reject this doctrine. See, e.g., Lord Bingham of Cornhill, The Rule of Law
and the Sovereignty of Parliament, 19 KING's L.J. 223 (2008); Michael Gordon, Conceptual
Foundationsof ParliamentarySovereignty: ReconsideringJennings and Wade,'2009 PUB. L.
519. Nevertheless, David Jenkins argues that the Human Rights Act has led to the emergence
of a common law power to declare statutes unconstitutional. Specifically, he claims that (1)
some common law rights, conventions, or fundamental statutes have acquired a higher,
constitutional status over ordinary laws; (2) that constitutional principles judicially derived
from these privileged legal sources empower courts to interpret statutes in accordance with
them, subject only to Parliament's clear intent to depart from them; (3) that there now
therefore exists within English common law a discretionary judicial power to (unenforceably)
declare that Parliament has enacted an unconstitutional statute; (4) that these constitutional
principles have a distinct origin outside the Human Rights Act and would be applicable even
if the Human Rights Act were amended or repealed, even though these principles have been
discovered only in light of the application of the Human Rights Act. David Jenkins, Common
Law Declarations of Unconstitutionality, 7 INT'L J. CONST. L. 183 (2009); see also Dawn
Oliver, Vers une Constitution Britannique Fondees sur des Principes Normatlfs, 60 REVUE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARE 807 (2008). For a recent comprehensive review of the
Human Rights Act in practice, see AILEEN KAVANAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE
UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT (2009).
176 For a summary of much of this literature, see Julie Debeljak, Parliamentary
Sovereignty andDialogue Under the Victorian CharterofHuman Rights and Responsibilities:
Drawing the Line Between Judicial Interpretationand JudicialLaw-Making, 33 MONASH U.
L. REv. 9 (2007). The principal contribution on this question in the Canadian context is Peter
W. Hogg & Allison A. Bushell, The CharterDialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or
Perhapsthe Charter of Rights Isn't Such A Bad Thing After All), 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 75
(1997) (updated by Peter W. Hogg, Allison A. Bushell Thornton & Wade K. Wright, Charter
Dialogue Revisited-Or "Much Ado About Metaphors", 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (2007)).
Hogg and Bushell argue that article 1 of the Charter, the general limitations clause, plays a
key role in ensuring dialogic cooperation between legislative bodies and reviewing courts.
Under the article 1 analysis developed by the Canadian Supreme Court in R. v. Oakes, [1986]
I S.C.R. 103 (Can.), judicial review has rarely questioned the objective of challenged
legislation, or the rationality of the means adopted to achieve the objective. Hogg & Bushell,
supra, at 93-94. Rather, Hogg and Bushell found in their initial study that in over eighty-five
percent of cases (forty-three out of fifty) in which legislation was struck down during the
period 1982-1997 for failure to satisfy the requirements of the Oakes analysis, the reason was
failure to pass a minium impairment test, according to which the means chosen to achieve the
statute's objective "must impair the objective no more than necessary to accomplish the
objective." Id. at 84-85 (citing R. v. Oakes, [19861 1 SCR 103 (Can.)). Failure of the
minimum impairment test does not foreclose pursuit of valid legislative objectives by less
restrictive means. Id. at 85. Thus, Hogg and Bushell found that, in most cases striking down
legislation for violation of article 1, there was some kind of legislative sequel, and in most
instances this involved minor amendment of the statute that did not sacrifice its original
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objective. Id. at 97 tbl. I, 101 tbl. III.
Many commentators are not persuaded by Hogg and Bushell. According to
Christopher Manfredi, declining use of article 33 reflects inevitable loss of political
credibility, which results from the fact that, in overriding court decisions, legislatures are
viewed as narrowing pre-existing rights. See Christopher P. Manfredi, The Unfulfilled
Promise ofDialogic Constitutionalism:Judicial-LegislativeRelationships under the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in PROTECTING RIGHTS WITHOUT A BILL OF RIGHTS:
INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE AND REFORM IN AUSTRALIA 239, 249-52 (Tom Campbell et al.
eds., 2006); see also John D. Whyte, Sometimes Constitutions are Made in the Streets: The
Future of the Charter'sNotwithstanding Clause, 16 CONST. F. 79, 81 (2007). Whyte agrees
that the characterization of article 33 as a "suspensive power" within a rights regime will
inevitably undermine its legitimacy. It is also worth noting that the negative perception of
legislative action is encouraged by the fact that Supreme Court decisions, once overridden,
remain authoritative interpretations of the Charter rights in question. In other words, since reenacted statutes take effect "notwithstanding" their unconstitutionality, it is clear that
Parliaments do not themselves engage in interpretation of Charter provisions, but are merely
empowered to override them. This explains the sunset provision in article 33. Thus, article 33
simply does not facilitate inter-agency dialog on the meaning of Charter provisions. In
contrast to Manfredi and Whyte, Mark Tushnet does not view judicial primacy as inevitable,
but does argue that weak judicial review is inherently unstable and will result in the primacy
of either the judiciary or legislature. See generally Mark Tushnet, Weak-Form Judicial
Review: Its Implicationsfor Legislatures,2 NEw ZEALAND J. PUB. INT'L. L. 7 (2004). Rosalind
Dixon argues that Charter dialogue has largely been illusory and has failed to prevent
Canadian judicial review from replicating U.S.-style strong judicial review; she suggests that
real dialogue will depend upon judicial deference developed under the general limitation
clause of article I in "second-look" cases. See Rosalind Dixon, The Supreme Court Of
Canada, CharterDialogue,and Deference, 47 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 235, 235, 240 (2009).
Hogg and Bushell would presumably respond to these critics that focusing on article
33 simply misunderstands the complexity of possible legislative responses. Statutory
amendment in response to a judicial decision is as much a function of dialog under the
Canadian Charter as is re-enactment under article 33, in that all subsequent legislative action
"is a conscious response from the competent legislative body to the words spoken by the
courts." Hogg & Bushell, supra, at 98. However, response does not necessarily imply
dialogue. Only article 33 provides the Parliament with a means of re-asserting its will, and if
article 33 fades out as a realistic option, then the resulting "inter-agency dialog[ue]" will
merely be a new name for strong judicial review. For a skeptical view that is conceptual,
rather than based on pragmatic objections to the dialogic capacity of the so-called
"Commonwealth model," see Sara Jackson, DesigningHuman Rights Legislation: 'Dialogue,'
the Commonwealth Model and the Roles of Parliamentsand Courts, 13 AuKLAND U. L. REV.
89, 115 (2007). Jackson regards the idea of inter-institutional dialogue as wrong-headed in
principle, an "unhelpful concept, which has perhaps been over-emphasized at the expense of
other beneficial innovations, such as the strengthening of representative institutions to
encourage legislative responsibility for rights." Id.
In a fascinating analysis ofjudicial rather than legislative deference, James B. Kelly
notes a decline in judicial activism that "reveals the central weakness of the judicial-centered
paradigm," which "overlooks the fact that many activist responses to the Charter exist and that
judicial deference is the result of a rights culture within the legislative process." JAMES B.
KELLY, GOVERNING WITH THE CHARTER: LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND FRAMERS'
INTENT 262 (2005). This culture is reflected in the fact that, at least in the federal and selected

provincial bureaucracies, "new procedures have been instituted to ensure that policy
objectives are explicitly linked to Charter commitments." Id. at 258. Kelly thus refers
approvingly to the Commonwealth model as emphasizing "the intra-institutional attempts to
safeguard rights within advanced parliamentary democracies," rather than "the interinstitutional relationships created between courts and legislatures through bills of rights." Id.

310

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:263

provide a meaningful way for legislatures to control the interpretation of
entrenched human rights guarantees, and therefore remove the most
objectionable aspect of judicial review, there seems to be no reason, from the
neo-Aristotelean point of view, to prefer the insertion of judicial review into
the political decision-making process in the first place.'
at 263. This shift in emphasis reveals that "[w]hat may be considered modest models (Canada)
or weak models (Britain and New Zealand) may be incorrect assessments because of the
importance of legislative activism and the replacement of judicial review with legislative
review for rights compliance." Id. at 265. In short, "[tlhe Commonwealth model ... suggests
that the commitment to rights is not predicated on the empowerment of courts through the
entrenchment of bills of rights, but on the development of a rights culture within the
institutions that formulate public policy." Id. at 264. The interesting question raised by Kelly's
observations is whether the legislative activism he documents reflects increased deliberative
intensity on the part of government or merely an increased fear of possible Supreme Court
reversal as a result of the judicial review function granted by the Charter. If the latter
explanation of legislative activism is correct, then judicial deference is actually an indicator of
judicial power under the Charter. In contrast to Kelly, Debeljak regards judicial deference,
like legislative deference, as a dialogic failure. Debeljak, supra, at 30-31, 58, 68.
177 Commentators who favor the idea that the Canadian Charter and the various
human rights acts establish a fruitful dialogue between legislatures and courts also tend to
view these bodies as having functionally differentiated roles within the dialog. For example,
Hogg and Bushell state that "[j]udicial review is not 'a veto over the politics of the nation,'
but rather the beginning of a dialogue as to how best to reconcile the individualistic values of
the [Canadian] Charter with the accomplishment of social and economic policies for the
benefit of the community as a whole." Hogg & Bushell, supra note 176, at 105 (citation
omitted). In other words, courts protect individual rights and legislatures advance communal
values as a whole. Julie Debeljak asserts that "[tihe analysis of the judiciary will proceed from
its distinct institutional perspective, which is informed by its unique non-majoritarian role, and
its particular concern about principle, reason, rationality, proportionality, and fairness."
Debeljak, supra note 176, at 30. In contrast, "[t]he distinct role of the representative arms is to
identify policy objectives and pursue legislative programmes designed to promote the
common good or mediate between competing legitimate public interests." Id. at 36. Debeljak
is careful "not to say that rights considerations are not and cannot be accounted for by the
representative arms; but merely to highlight that majoritarian preferences correctly compete
with rights concerns." Id. In other words, the role of the legislature is to "incorporate rights
considerations 'into a larger policy inquiry . . . .'" Id. (citation omitted). Despite this
concession, there can be little doubt that Debeljak regards the judiciary as possessed of a
unique expertise in the interpretation of rights-granting provisions. Id. at 33. For Debeljak, the
functionally differentiated roles of legislature and judiciary lead to a dialogue that is
"complementary" and "educative." Id. at 37.
From the neo-Aristotelean perspective, one seeks some justification for the
functional differentiation of the roles of legislature and judiciary, upon which the dialog
model appears to rest. At best, the assertion of judicial expertise in matters of principle,
reason, rationality, proportionality, and fairness, implies that the basic ethical inquiry into the
identification and analysis of the proper scope of personal autonomy is by its nature a legal or
doctrinal inquiry into the definition and scope of personal rights. Such an assertion simply
assumes its own conclusion. A far better argument would be to assert that courts possess a
unique institutional opportunity to test general norms by applying them to specific fact
situations, which is precisely what courts are called upon to do in individual cases brought
before them. Their findings then become a feedback mechanism that legislatures can use to
refine the general norms that they are uniquely positioned to adopt as representatives of the
whole political community. This assertion differs from Debeljak's by focusing on the
functionally distinct contexts in which legislature and judiciary contemplate the definition of
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C Two Defenses of Judicial Review as a Democratic Institution
The strong version ofjudicial review found in the United States rests
upon the idea that courts stand outside the political process and therefore
trump possible incursions against fundamental rights arising within the
political process. Therefore, it rests upon a particular version of separationof-powers doctrine that is unlikely to permit limits on judicial hegemony
over the determination of constitutional questions. However, there are
several ways to argue that judicial review in the United States is part and
rights, rather than on the allegedly lesser capacity of the legislature to resist "[t]he selfinterested and non-rights preferences of the majority[, . . . which] correctly compete with ...
protected rights." Debeljak, supra note 176, at 39 n.150. Moreover, this argument models the
very process of phronesis-driven norm creation that lies at the heart of the mechanics of
virtue. This argument may be reflected in the language of the Victorian Charter, which
designates an advisory judicial decision as a "declaration of inconsistent application," Victoria
Charter § 36, not (in the manner of the British Human Rights Act) a "declaration of
incompatibility." Human Rights Act (U.K.) § 4.
The neo-Aristotelean critique of the concept of functionally differentiated dialog
applies also to neo-Kantian efforts to justify judicial review on the basis of the relative
institutional capacities of judiciary and legislature. To take a rather pro-legislative example,
Christopher Zum agrees that strong judicial review violates the "deliberative" element of
legitimate governance. CHRISTOPHER ZURN, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND THE
INSTITUTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (2007). He states that "public reasoning practices among
citizens and officials should have some direct or indirect influence over the formulation of,
decisions upon, and execution of governmental action." Id. at 70. He theorizes a link between
this deliberative concept of political legitimacy and democracy on the ground that
deliberative, "reason-responsive government" embodies "an ideal of the equal justifiability, to
each citizen, of the use of their collective political power." Id. at 71. Strong judicial review is
a form of quasi-guardianship that violates the criterion of "legitimate collective autonomy."
Id. Borrowed from Rousseau, as well as Habermas, this criterion states that "I, as a citizen,
can only understand myself as autonomous (as a self-ruling agent) while living under a set of
collectively-binding and coercive laws, to the extent that I can understand those laws as, in
some sense, self-authored and thus self-imposed." ZuRN, supra, at 70-71, 224-25.
Like Habermas's neo-Kantianism, Zurn's concept of deliberative democracy is
obviously sympathetic to the generally democratic implications of the neo-Aristotelean theory
of political virtue. Also like Habermas, Zurn anticipates problems in democracy that could
undermine the deliberative requirement of autonomy. But where Habermas simply excises
irresolvable conflict from the democratic process in order to preserve autonomy, Zurn insists
upon the necessity of some "proceduralist" form of constitutional review designed to prevent
the perversion of democracy by "certain predictable consequences of the structural features of
representative democratic institutions." Id. at 160. More specifically, proceduralist
constitutional review must protect a broad array of civil liberties necessary to "private
autonomy," upon which effective democratic deliberation depends. Id. at 225, 232, 235, 239.
Thus Zurn provisionally endorses a variety of horizontally and vertically dispersed forms of
constitutional review, including specialized constitutional courts, legislative and regulatory
self-review panels, devices (like the legislative override) designed to achieve inter-branch
debate and decisional authority, and public constitutional fora, such as "deliberative public
opinion polls." Id. at 325. However, Zurn's argument is unpersuasive to the neo-Aristotelean
because it does not investigate the normative foundation of the deliberative element in
legitimate self-government, and therefore lacks a conceptual framework within which to
evaluate its compatibility with weak, but still independent, constitutional review. He merely
assumes such compatibility.
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parcel of the democratic process, rather than a check upon its possible
excesses. The following sections review two of these arguments, in order to
determine whether they are able to salvage strong judicial review from the
standpoint of the neo-Aristotelean theory of political virtue.
D. Judicial Review as a Component of Pluralist Democracy
The argument that judicial review is a component of pluralist
democracy is well represented by Terri Jennings Peretti's work, In Defense
of a Political Court. 178 Peretti borrows from the theory of pluralist
democracy to argue that strong judicial review is not only compatible with
democracy, but an essential instrument for the fashioning of political
consensus.' 79 In particular, she asserts that the United States Supreme Court
serves "as an institutional recourse for legislative or administrative losers."so
Thus, she agrees with non-democratic defenders of judicial review that the
primary function of the Supreme Court is to protect personal rights against
majority encroachment, at least in the context of constitutional litigation.
However, she also asserts that it is not necessary to understand the Supreme
Court as "a deviant and undemocratic institution" on the way to justifying
that function.s18
As presented by Peretti, pluralist democracy has several major,
interrelated components. The first feature is representational diversity.
Pluralist democracy places no premium on direct, majority rule. For
example, within the American context, the Electoral College and Senate
confirmation of executive branch nominees, as well as of nominees to the
Federal Judiciary, are examples of indirect representation.18 2 Different forms
178

TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT (1999).

Peretti borrows principally from Robert Dahl in developing her concept of
judicial review within a pluralist democracy. Dahl endorses a utilitarian view of democracy,
according to which it efficiently aggregates the interests of citizens, and he asserts that "the
legitimacy of the constitution ought to derive solely from its utility as an instrument of
democratic government." ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION? 39 (1989). Having asserted the primacy of democratic process, Dahl also
argues that "no interests should be inviolable beyond those integral or essential to the
democratic process." DAHL, DEMOCRACY, supra note 8, at 182. Thus, judicial review is
limited to protecting the "polyarchal" decision procedures necessary to or convenient for the
efficient aggregation of citizens' interests. In this respect, Dahl supports a weakly democratic
form ofjudicial review, much like that which Ely supports. See ELY, supra note 159.
Peretti understands pluralist democracy as a descriptive theory. She claims that as an
empirical matter the theory of democracy as pluralist governance better explains the operation
of American politics, and the role of the Supreme Court, than does the theory of democracy as
majority rule, achieved through "regularized elections." PERETTI, supra note 178, at 210, 216.
However, to the extent that judicial review, in the context of American politics, goes beyond
the monitoring of democratic decision procedures, Peretti describes a phenomenon that goes
well beyond what Dahl himself would endorse.
180
PERETTI, supra note 178, at 212, 219.
179

1'
182

Id. at 217

Peretti is confusing on the point of the distinction between direct and indirect
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of representation are designed to achieve different types of democratic
responsiveness, none of which is more democratic, more paradigmatic of
democracy, or empirically more significant than any other. 13 Direct
democracy codifies the will of the majority, while indirect democracy works
to refine and moderate the majority's demands.
It is also a tenet of pluralist democracy that political institutions are
arranged in a non-hierarchical manner, with the result that no institution has
unilateral power over another. '84 This aspect of pluralist democracy is
closely linked to representational diversity, in that the extent of any political
body's majoritarian accountability is "inconsequential in determining an
institution's legitimacy, value, or power in the governing process." 8 Thus,
"in a pluralist system, it is of no consequence that the Court is representative
or responsive in a different-that is, nonelectoral-way."1 86
A third feature of pluralist democracy is systematic redundancy,
achieved through structural fragmentation into separate branches and levels
of government, and through staggered elections. 187 This feature is also
closely linked to representational diversity, in that such redundancy is
designed to prevent the emergence of any single, dominant majority.
These three features are designed to ensure "political consensus of a
broad, certain, and enduring nature." 188 Redundancy and lack of strict
hierarchy reduce the possibility of error in codification of the public will by
expanding opportunities for political action and disabling the force of
momentary majority passion.189 Together with diversity of representational
modes, they create various paths to multiple veto points, operationalized by
different kinds of pressure and political action. "[O]pportunities for groups to
gain access to and an effective voice in government policymaking are greatly
expanded."' 90 As a result, "the political system . . . will possess a greater
capacity to discover, with more certainty and reliability, the stable and
enduring bases of political consensus." 91 Each form of representation and
representation. On the one hand, she suggests that representation is indirect when the polity
does not itself decide, but chooses representatives by simple majority to decide for them.
Thus, in describing the rationale underlying Madison's argument in Federalist No. 10, Peretti
states that "a republic or indirect democracy was preferred to a direct democracy .... Elected
representatives could refine and moderate the majority's selfish and emotional demands."
PERETTI, supra note 178, at 211. Then again, in contrasting direct and indirect forms of
representation, she states that "only the House was to be directly elected by the people.
Senators were selected by state legislators, presidents by the electoral college, and members of
the judiciary by the president and Senate." Id. I use the term "indirect" to refer to this latter,
two-step form of selection.
183

Id. at 218.

'"

Id. at 214.

18s
186

187
188
189

'9

Id. at 218.

Id. at 219.
PERETtI, supra note 178, at 211-12.

Id. at 212.
Id
Id. at 219

191 Id
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each site of group access and influence is regarded as instrumentally valuable
in providing a partial means to political consensus, rather than as having any
normative, intrinsic value of its own. 192
How is strong judicial review subjected to democratic control within
the scheme of pluralist democracy? In answering this question, Peretti's key
assertion is that the Supreme Court engages in "value-voting." 93 First, she
claims that "there is quite simply no alternative available [because] . . .
constitutional theory fails to limit significantly the necessity of discretionary
and subjective value choice in constitutional decision-making or to deny
justices the opportunity to decide in accordance with their personal
beliefs."' 9 4 Second, Peretti cites and summarizes a large body of empirical
research suggesting that Supreme Court policy-making reflects the
ideological preferences of the Justices. 195 This preliminary assertion is
critical to Peretti's overall claim that judicial review is embedded within the
democratic process rather than an exception to it because, without valuevoting, the Supreme Court would have no way to represent viewpoints or to
contribute to political consensus.
The existence of value-voting allows Peretti to claim that judicial
review is subject to democratic control through a process of indirect
representation. 196 Indirect representation occurs if the Justices' political
views will have been consciously and deliberately vetted by elected officials
competing for control of the Supreme Court through the appointment
process. 197 According to Peretti, empirical evidence suggests that the
President and Senate do use ideology as a criterion in the recruitment and
selection of Justices, and that there is some competitive balance between
them, although the President holds the advantage if he selects a nominee not
obviously unqualified or out of the mainstream.' 98 Indirect representation is
ensured not only by the dominance of political considerations in the selection
process, but by the reality of "dynamic representation," i.e., the statistically
regular opportunity for appointments. 99
Indirect representation translates into political responsiveness only if
the selection criteria shape the content of the Court's decisions. According to
Peretti, empirical evidence "rather clearly and consistently supports the
conclusion that there is a strong and direct relationship between presidential
expectations and judicial decision-making." 200 The stronger the President's
commitment to ideology-based appointments, the stronger is the linkage

'9

Id. at 214-15.
PERETI,supra note 178, at 110-11.

194

Id. at 101-02.

"
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Id. at 102.
Id. at 84.

'9'
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Id. at 84-86.
PERETrI, supra note 178, at 100.
Id. at ll -30.

192

200

POLITICAL VIRTUE AND JUDICIAL RE VIEW

2011]1

315

between his expectations and Justices' voting.201 Failure occurs when the
President has not taken sufficient care in evaluating nominees or lacks
political support necessary to win Senate confirmation.20 2
The question is whether strong judicial review, thus described as an
element of pluralist democracy, is compatible with the neo-Aristotelean
theory of political virtue. It is not, because pluralist democracy stumbles in
its insistence that all forms of responsiveness are equivalent forms of
democratic control. From the standpoint of the theory of political virtue, the
indirect democracy of judicial review provides the polity with insufficient
forms of both input and output control over the formation of constitutional
doctrine.
The first point to consider arises from the concept of value-voting as
described above.203 If the Supreme Court exercising judicial review is not
explicitly or overtly representative, then citizens will not have the sense that
their views explicitly influence those of the Justices making the decision. In
Aristotle's ethics, political friendship is an instance of virtuous friendship
generally, and such friendship implies a conscious mutuality of influence
based on virtuous conduct. There is a dialogic component to even the most
cursory forms of friendship, which is lacking when friends do not explicitly
recognize each other's influence. There is something of this dialogic
component in Aristotle's requirement that friends must know each other and
wish each other's good. To the extent that Supreme Court Justices
understand their roles as interpreting and applying doctrine, or even their
own conceptions of what morality requires, rather than explicitly entering
into a decisive conversation with the views of citizens, there is a failure of
dialogue and therefore of friendship. Without political friendship there is no
opportunity for virtuous political action and, therefore, no political selfactualization for the citizens.
Lack of meaningful representation can be viewed as a failure of
input control. Whether a citizen who disagrees with the results of judicial
review has adequate means of recourse is a question of output control.
Adequate recourse means having an opportunity to engage in political
activity (in the Aristotelean sense) designed to overturn the results of judicial
review. Here the failure of pluralist democracy, at least in the American
context, is equally great, for it offers nothing like the legislative override or
any other method of subjecting judicial review to direct ex post facto
political control.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 120, 123. There are also informal avenues of influence over the Supreme
Court. Id. at 147-51. Most important is the influence of interest groups, which set the agenda
by bringing the suits upon which constitutional challenges are based. Id at 147-48. In
addition, such groups are largely responsible for amicus curiae briefs, which significantly
increase the likelihood that the Supreme Court will hear a case on the merits. PERETTI, supra
note 178, at 148. Finally, interest groups also apply political pressure, oftentimes by turning
Supreme Court decisions into election issues. Id. at 247.
203 See supra notes 193-199.
201
202
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From the standpoint of the neo-Aristotelean theory of political
virtue, Peretti's basic mistake is to understand the form of representation
characteristic of legislative supremacy as essentially or merely majoritarian.
The neo-Aristotelean theory asserts that the unique, qualitative significance
of such representation arises from the fact that the citizens' views are
understood explicitly as the substantive source of the decisions made. When
the views of the citizens are regarded in this way, they are no longer just a
form of judgment (sunesis), but a form of morally significant action, leading
to political self-actualization. Without such action, citizens will not have an
opportunity to fulfill their political natures and will to that extent be
precluded from achieving their good. 20
Peretti's argument raises the question of just how explicit and direct
the community members' influence on decision-making must be to count as
action rather than judgment about action. Must the citizens have both input
and output control over the Supreme Court's decisions? Would one or the
other suffice? Does judicial review, by its very nature, violate the
requirements of political virtue? Certainly the neo-Aristotelean theory of
political virtue does not require the populist panacea of instant Internet-based
referenda. It does not even assert that high levels of participation in elections
are necessarily a good outcome. It requires only that those who wish to
cultivate political virtue be provided an opportunity to engage in morally
significant political action. The kind of democratic representation Peretti
describes does not satisfy this standard because it does not recognize the
unique moral value of decisive, dialogic involvement in the determination of
generally applicable rules of conduct.
E. Judicial Review as the Guarantor of Popular Sovereignty
Keith Whittington makes a normative argument for the legitimacy of
judicial review based on originalist interpretation of the Constitution's
Thus, the neo-Aristotelean theory of political virtue rejects republican
arguments that judicial review should serve democratic interests, without itself being
democratic. For example, Christopher L. Eisgruber concedes that democracy should
encourage public deliberation, i.e., conversation among citizens about basic questions of
political justice. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 86
(2001). But such "democratic flourishing" does not require that citizens have the power to
influence the outcome of debate. According to Eisgruber, participation in the sense of
exercising power can occur only at the local level in large-scale democracies. Id.; see also id.
at 223 n.25. Judicial review serves the values of democracy by inspiring moral debate among
private citizens, but in Eisgruber's view it is a mistake to judge the representativeness of
judicial review in terms of whether the public actually exercises control over it. Id. at 88.
Justification of judicial review as a source of moral instruction is not new. Bickel
argued that "the courts, although they may somewhat dampen the people's and the
legislatures' efforts to educate themselves, are also a great and highly effective educational
institution." BICKEL, supra note 159, at 26. Bickel also quotes similar views from various
earlier authorities, dating back as far as 1825. Id.
204
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text.2 05 According to Whittington, the "critical originalist directive is that the
Constitution . .. be interpreted according to the understandings made public
at the time of the drafting and ratification." 20 6 Since ratifying conventions
were the "specifically designated device for gathering public sentiment on
the Constitution," priority in interpretation should be given to direct evidence
of the ratifiers' intentions.207 Additional information may be taken from the
drafting conventions, popular debates surrounding ratification, and
208
contemporary commentary, as indirect evidence of the ratifiers' intentions.
This is a standard definition of originalism, but unlike most
originalists, Whittington does not justify it as a means of restraining judicial
intervention.20 9 In fact, he is not specifically, or programatically, concerned
with preventing the counter-majoritarian effect of judicial review at all.
Whittington would probably concede that originalist interpretation will often,
or even usually, result in a reviewing court's determination to uphold a
challenged law, but this is a contingent result, unrelated to the justification of
originalism. What justifies judicial review according to Whittington is a
reviewing court's "claim to be enforcing the supreme law of the sovereign
people." 2 o Properly understood, originalism's agenda is to uphold the will of
the sovereign people, as embodied in the intentions of those who ratified the
people's fundamental law. The originalist court should strike down
legislation that ignores, supplements, or strays beyond the value choices
expressed by the Framers. An originalist court is not necessarily a passive
court, even though it may be said to give "the presumption to the current
majority's legislative action." 2 1 1
The first thing to note about Whittington's argument is that it
205

KEITH

E.

WHITTINGTON,

CONSTITUTIONAL

MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT & JUDICIAL REVIEw

(1999).

INTERPRETATION:

TEXTUAL

Id. at 35.
Id. at 35-36.
208 Id. at 36. For the purposes of this "extemalist" argument, Whittington
assumes
the existence of such intentions and the ability of courts faithfully to reconstruct them in order
to justify judicial review. He elsewhere makes an "internalist" argument that assumes the
desirability ofjudicial review and justifies the claim for the existence of recoverable intentions
in order to further justify originalism as the proper interpretive strategy of courts exercising
judicial review under the Constitution. See generally id at 77-109. Of course, since
government operates under state and federal constitutions, and each has been adopted and
amended at different times, the relevant group of ratifiers, whose intentions must be
recovered, will differ depending upon the particular constitutional text and clause at issue.
209
Whittington usefully identifies a variety of more typical reasons for endorsing
originalism. Id. at 38-46. These include, inter alia, the desire to prevent judges from engaging
in "willful or arbitrary behavior," the commitment to the separation of judicial and legislative
functions, and the related belief that courts should accept the will of present majorities
expressed through legislation. WITTINGTON, supra note 205, at 38-46. As Whittington points
out, the first concern can be addressed by any theory of interpretation capable of generating
clear rules of construction and, therefore, does not necessarily support originalism. Id.
However, it is the last of these concerns to which he takes special exception. Id.
206
207
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Id. at 46.
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expresses a theory of popular sovereignty and only secondarily a theory of
judicial review. Therefore, to critique Whittington from the point of view of
the neo-Aristotelean theory of political virtue is to ask whether the form of
government that follows from this theory of sovereignty (including the
institution of judicial review) is sufficiently responsive to citizens' need for
occasion to exercise political virtue to enable them to achieve eudaimonia
with respect to political friendship. As we shall see, Aristotle's theory is in
some respects sympathetic to Whittington's, particularly to the latter's
insistence upon actual self-government. In the end, Whittington too will be
found wanting from the neo-Aristotelean point of view, but for reasons
distinct from those that apply to Peretti. In her case, it is the lack of dialogic
representativeness in decision-making that leaves the citizens' choices
without direct causal efficacy. Whittington's insistence on actual selfgovernment, enforced in part through judicial review faithful to the
expression of the citizens' will in constitutional text, re-establishes the
citizens' direct responsibility for the creation of fundamental law. The
problem with Whittington's theory is that it is partial; it makes no provision
for the possibility of continuous or complete self-government.
In developing his theory of popular sovereignty, Whittington's
primary concern is to preserve its democratic character. However, he locates
the origin of popular sovereignty within a "positivist" tradition that is
212
problematic from a democratic standpoint. Tracing the modern theory of
sovereignty back to the sixteenth century, Whittington argues that it was then
concerned with the need for political order in a world newly understood as
composed of separate nations with identifiable populations and geographical
limits. Against this background, the defining feature of sovereignty remains
the imposition of order across space and through time; it is essentially "the
power to decide." 2 13 As originally theorized by Bodin and Hobbes, the
sovereign will is necessarily active, for it exists only in the act of deciding.2 14
Thus, sovereign power is necessarily indivisible and non-delegable, for any
division or alienation of decision-making authority results in forfeiture of
sovereignty itself. This leads to the conclusion that the supreme or sovereign
will must be embodied in a single, all-powerful individual.
Against the background of absolutism, constitutionalism was,
according to Whittington, conceived as a means to constrain the monarch. Its
primary achievement was conceptually to separate the exercise of power by
government officials from the source of sovereign power in the people at
large. In Lockean terms, the people retain sovereign authority through a
theoretical right to rebel against unfaithful agents, but the doctrine of
parliamentary supremacy assumes that, in practical terms, sovereignty itself
212
213
214

Id. at 113-23.
WHITTINGTON, supra note 205, at 114.
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is still alienated when the power to decide is transferred from the people to
its agents.
According to Whittington, Montesquieu and Rousseau avoided the
alienation of sovereign power simply by identifying popular will with
legislative outcomes. In Montesquieu's version of sovereignty, individuals
are re-incorporated in the sovereign will through their virtue, which causes
them freely to accept the law as a rule. Implicit in Montesquieu's version is
the notion of a controlling, collective will, for "the individual's role 2as
15
monarch is contingent upon his agreeing with the 'people as a body."'
"One cannot remain sovereign and be separated from that will."2 16 Unity of
sovereign will was reified by Rousseau. In his version, the virtue of
individuals is replaced by the indivisible, collective will of the citizenry as a
single unit. "[T]he private interests of individuals' particular wills have no
bearing on the sovereign general will." 2 17 The collective sovereign does not
transfer sovereignty to its agents because will cannot be transferred; so
Rousseau's version advocates periodic reformation of the sovereign
assembly so that it can reestablish its authoritative will.
Whittington argues that all of these theories about the location of
sovereignty are constrained by the original view that sovereign power cannot
be delegated without alienation of sovereignty itself, together with the
associated requirement that the sovereign be ever active. As a result, the
constitutionalism of neither Locke nor Montesquieu limits the exercise of
sovereign power by means of the device of popular consent.2 18 Locke's
version depends upon the idea that sovereignty itself is limited by the
purposes for which civil society is formed. Thus, the source of sovereignty
(i.e., natural reason, embodied in the social contract that creates the political
community) imposes limits on the exercise of power.219 In Montesquieu's
case, the virtue of individual citizens aligns their views with government
policy, but does not limit government's political options. For Montesquieu,
formation of the popular will and its fusion with government imply the
necessity of separating the sovereign deliberative function of legislation from
the purely ministerial functions of administration and adjudication, rather
than the necessity of preserving the people's political agency. 2 20 Rousseau's
stronger version of Montesquieu's collective will does impose popular limits
by periodically taking authority back into its own hands, but his solution is
215 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 8, 10,22-23,35 (Anne M. Cohler et al.
eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
216 WHITTINGTON, supra note 205, at 121.
217
Id. at 123. Thus, the individual whose views place him in the minority must
recognize that his personal views are mistaken as a statement of what he, as a member of the
sovereign will, believes.
218
This can no longer be regarded as true in parliamentary democracies, where the
concept of responsible government, carried out through regular, democratic elections ensures
that parliament embodies the views of a broad constituency.
219 WHITTINGTON, supra note 205, at 119.
220
Id. at 121.
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found impractical. At least in the context of the American Constitution's
founding, it was "impossible to go so far as to assemble the whole people"
*
into ratifying
conventions. 221
Whittington proposes to reconceptualize popular sovereignty in such
a way that it avoids the "continuing threat" posed by the tendency of
sovereignty theory to transfer the locus of power from the people to the
people's government.222 His argument is a descriptive effort "to reconstruct a
theory of popular sovereignty that can ground the authority of the
Constitution and indicate why an originalist jurisprudence can play an
integral role in maintaining that sovereignty." 2 23 Within such a theory, the
Constitution itself embodies, and judicial review reinforces, popular
sovereignty, while imposing limits on the exercise of power by government.
The obvious question Whittington must address is how a
constitutional text adopted in the eighteenth century, even though
subsequently amended periodically throughout the nation's history, can
claim to continue to embody the sovereign will of the people. He rejects tacit
consent, inferred from "actual behavior . . . construed as an indirect

expression of consent." 2 24 He also rejects hypothetical consent to government
that embodies or pursues that to which we ought to consent. Neither tacit nor
hypothetical consent requires any actual causal nexus between citizens'
deliberate desires and political result. Therefore, they "undermine[] the
[purpose of consent] by positing the existence of consent where no
deliberative choice has been made."225
Whittington's solution is a theory of "potential sovereignty," which
does not assume the existence of a currently active sovereign.226 In his view,
"The government was set in motion by consent, but it need not demonstrate
our continuing consent in order to remain in motion. It is enough that it not
change course, or . .. stop its motion, except by our new [expression of]
consent." In short, the sovereign will remains authoritative in its potential to
alter the direction or trajectory of the Constitution's current motion. As
Whittington puts it, the Constitution is binding not in the strong sense of
enjoying continuing consent, but "in a weaker, but still sufficient sense, in
that it represents our potential to govern ourselves. By accepting the
authority of the Constitution, we accept our own authority to remake it." 22 7
Id. at 125.
Id. at 135.
223
Id. at 126-27. Whittington claims that the founders were "mired in theoretical
difficulties" and operated with a "confused concept of sovereignty," which tended to attribute
sovereign to governments, once constituted by the people. Id. at 127.
221

222

4

WHITTNGTON, supra note 205, at 129.

Id. at 129-30.
Id. at 132-33.
227
Id. at 133; see also id. at 144, 149. In fact, potential sovereignty comes
perilously close to being a form of tacit consent. Whittington might reply that he objects only
to a form of tacit consent that justifies judicial invention, i.e., a form of tacit consent that
permits the locus of sovereignty to shift from the people to the government itself Potential
sovereignty does not authorize such a shift and, therefore, is unlike the tacit consent to which
225

226
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Potential sovereignty leads to a concept of "democratic dualism,"
according to which there are two, hierarchically arranged kinds of political
trust, granted at different times by different manifestations of the people. The
lesser kind specifies the agent-wielder of power and results in the policies
pursued by government. It is expressed in regular elections. The more
important form of political trust specifies the nature and scope of power
exercised by the wielders of power and legitimates the government itself. It
is expressed when "the people emerge at particular historical moments to
deliberate on constitutional issues and to provide binding expressions of their
will, which are to serve as fundamental law in the future when the sovereign
is absent." Thus, democratic dualism (i.e., the presence or absence of the
sovereign) distinguishes between "the constitutional and merely
administrative" elements of politics. 2 28 In other words, whereas Montesquieu
distinguished between the legislative and administrative (including judicial)
functions, democratic dualism distinguishes between constitutional and
administrative (including both legislative and judicial). Legislation is
demoted to a status less than law, i.e., it does not embody the sovereign will
of the citizens.
Both judicial review and originalist interpretation necessarily follow
in their turn from democratic dualism as understood by Whittington. 2 29 The
he objects. However, potential sovereignty does take tacit acquiescence in the existing
Constitution as evidence of an unwillingness to exercise sovereign power to change it. In that
sense it still posits the existence of consent where no deliberative choice has necessarily been
made. See id. at 144, 149.
228 WHITTINGTON, supra note 205, at 135.
229
Originalism does not necessarily follow from democratic dualism. For
example, Bruce Ackerman argues that the role of the Supreme Court is to represent (through
doctrinal innovation), rather than to preserve (through originalist interpretation), the people's
higher law-making function, except during those rare times that the people are constituted to
act for themselves. This is justified by the fact that "elected politicians find it expedient to
exploit the apathy, ignorance, and selfishness of normal politics in ways that endanger
fundamental traditions." BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONs 20 (1991).
Samuel Freeman attempts to give this argument a neo-Kantian foundation based on
hypothetical consent. He asserts that "[tihe appropriate way to determine the principles of
government and society is by asking what free and equal persons themselves, from a position
of equal right, could mutually accept and agree to as the conditions for their social and
political relations." Samuel Freeman, Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of
JudicialReview, 9 L. & PHIL. 327, 342-43 (1990). He then argues that: (1) such a people,
acting in their constituent capacity, would freely and mutually (i.e., unanimously) agree only
to the constraint of a law-making procedure that preserves their equal right; and (2) that such a
procedure would include both majority rule (for the establishment of law within the
constitutional system) and some constitutive guarantee (whether it be carried out through
majority rule alone, or by means of an additional procedural device, such as judicial review)
of protection from the incursions that bare majoritarianism might make into the substantive
rights and liberties necessary to the enjoyment of equal freedom. According to this
"contractarian" justification of judicial review, "certain substantive rights and requirements of
justice underlie our commitment to the political procedures of a democracy," and it is these
substantive values, rather than the written Constitution, that judicial review is committed to
preserve. Id. at 336. As a result, "[o]ur written Constitution is . . . only a part[] of our
constitution. It plays a significant though non-exclusive role in constitutional interpretation."
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existence of a written fundamental law entails the need for interpretation,
hence the need for judicial review. Acting as the people's agents, reviewing
courts themselves become an expression of democracy, rather than an
impediment, but only through the medium of originalist interpretation.
Originalism adheres to the sovereign intent, rather than to a presumed source
of sovereign intent. In so doing, courts recognize the possibility for a
renewed, authoritative exercise of popular constitutional deliberation. Thus,
originalism insists upon the reality of consent as the basis for government
action. According to Whittington, "The American advance in constitutional
practice was to realize popular sovereignty as a concrete force in historical
time. Popular sovereignty ceased to be a hypothetical construct by which to
measure government action and became an actual device for selfgovernance." 2 3 0 As a result, originalism is not one among many possible
interpretive strategies open to reviewing courts but, through democratic
dualism, is built into the very fabric and logic of the Constitution.
From the perspective of the neo-Aristotelean theory of political
virtue, the question is whether or not the consent envisioned by potential
sovereignty and democratic dualism is sufficient to enable citizens to achieve
eudaimonia.As already noted, the neo-Aristotelean theory is sympathetic to
Whittington's emphasis on the importance of self-government. The essence
of popular sovereignty, preserved in the device of democratic dualism, is to
protect the citizens' power to decide. The power to decide is precisely what
citizens must exercise in order to engage in the type of moral choice-making
that the neo-Aristotelean theory requires.
In fact, the neo-Aristotelean theory improves Whittington's version
of constitutional democracy by giving it a normative basis. Whittington
justifies self-government on the following alternative bases that: (1) the
Id. at 369.
Freeman recognizes that judicial review does not necessarily follow from the
democratic "form of sovereignty . . . based in an ideal of the equality, independence, and
original political jurisdiction of all citizens." Id. at 327. Judicial review is appropriate "when
the public sense of justice is not sufficiently developed or directed to influence legislative
procedures to make the necessary corrections to democratic justice, or when the legislative
branch is so controlled by particular interests (due, most often, to the influence of wealth on
elections and legislative processes) that it does not accurately reflect considered public views
in matters of justice." Id. at 361. This is essentially an ad hominem argument, resting on a
stipulated premise that democracy by definition presupposes the very rights associated with
the U.S. Constitution, as elaborated by the Supreme Court. See id. at 338, 362. Unsurprisingly,
from this premise Freeman concludes that democracy is compatible with a non-originalist
version of strong judicial review.
230
WHITTINGTON, supra note 205, at 156. Whittington assigns judges the same
status as legislators, stating that "[j]udges are as much the people's agents as are elected
representatives." Id. at 124. "The judiciary can speak neither for nor to the absent sovereign.
As part of the government, the judiciary is merely an agent of the sovereign .... ."Id. at 154.
Nevertheless, judicial authority comes from its "functional expertise," which in turn benefits
from the judiciary's isolation from normal electoral forces. Id. at 153-54. Thus, Whittington
shares with Zurn and Freeman the functionalist view that judicial review plays a special role
in democracy.
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power to decide constitutional forms must be lodged somewhere; (2) the
power to shape government should reside with those who must live under it;
or (3) good government requires participation of the people through popular
sovereignty because the results of the people's deliberations will be
reasonable. 23 1The first basis provides no justification of democracy at all.
The second and third bases provide potential justifications for democracy,
but are assertions rather than justifications as stated. In contrast, the neoAristotelean theory of political virtue provides a foundation for both
assertions and therefore provides a foundation for democracy. With respect
to the second basis, the achievement of eudaimonia requires active
participation in political choice-making.232 With respect to the third basis, the
necessary limitation of individuals' experiences implies that the summing of
those experiences in a deliberative process will lead to better results.2 33 At
the very least, the neo-Aristotelean theory makes explicit what is merely
implicit in Whittington's version of constitutional democracy.
But democratic dualism is problematic from the Aristotelean
standpoint because it is not democratic enough, i.e., it limits the possibility of
self-government (for contemporary citizens) to the determination of
administrative issues that fall outside the Constitution. Such determinations
Id. at 138, 140.
The neo-Aristotelean argument also improves on the "core" (i.e., normative)
argument for preferring democratic decision-making to decision-making by judicial review
offered by Jeremy Waldron. See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006). He asserts that only majoritarian decisionmaking, realized through legislative supremacy, protects the "deontological" right to equal
and fair participation in society's decision-making, enjoyed by every citizen-member of a
democratic political community; in other words, without democracy there is no equal and fair
participation. However, he provides no genuine normative foundation for the right to equal
and fair participation itself. Instead, he simply stipulates that respect for rights (and the right
of equal and fair participation, in particular) is a systemic requirement of democracy; in other
words, without equal and fair participation there is no democracy. Thus, Waldron's argument
is tautologous: democracy justifies the protection of "deontological" rights, and those very
same rights justify democracy. See generally id. In contrast, the neo-Aristotelean theory
grounds its preference for democratic decision-making in a genuinely normative conception of
the excellent performance of a human being's characteristic function.
233
This same point has been made recently by Francis Kieran. Francis Kieran,
Duelling with Dworkin: PoliticalMorality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 6 U.C. DUBLIN L.
REV. 30 (2006). Kieran argues that "the legislature is (in theory at least) a better forum for
getting closer to the elusive moral 'right answer,' by allowing for interactive dialectic
reasoning and by being less homogenous in its cultural perspectives than the judiciary." Id. at
47. However, Kieran believes that "morality is inherently subjective," leading him to conclude
that "there are some things that cannot be learned and . . . political morality is one of them."
Id. at 39. Morality and technical skill are in no way congruent." Id. at 36. This view undercuts
the argument that the legislature could, through the summing of more viewpoints, come closer
than judges to the moral right answer, for the simple reason that it denies the existence of any
such right answer. In contrast, the neo-Aristotelean theory of political virtue accepts the
existence of truth conditions for moral propositions, though not the metaphysical reality of
such propositions. In doing so, it provides the groundwork for a theory of moral education,
expertise, and practice, which is a necessary condition of any argument that distinguishes
between the relative merits of legislative (or consensual) versus judicial decision-making.
231
232
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are "constitutional constructions" that fill gaps until the sovereign people
choose to fill them directly. 234 Constitutional questions themselves are
insulated from routine, popular deliberation, and should the sovereign people
emerge to fill constitutional gaps, then newly constitutionalized issues will
henceforth be insulated from such deliberation as well. This suggests that the
issues of greatest importance in contemporary democracies, including those
involving the extent of personal liberty and the nature of equality, are
235
precisely the ones that citizens will not be able to address.
This makes sense to Whittington, because of the demoted and
secondary character of legislation. In his view, constitutional constructions
are not only unauthorized by the sovereign, but are unstable because
"maintained only by the continuing efforts of political actors themselves."2 36
The so-called "partial sovereign" is an always active sovereign whose
actions result in "consistency," but not law. In contrast, the logic of neoAristotelean political virtue places great weight on the very process of "mere
administration" that Whittington disparages, and therefore suggests that the
most important issues should fall within the scope of the political process
that "mere administration" describes. In fact, the locus of sovereignty is
unimportant to the neo-Aristotelean theory of political virtue. Whether the
legislature or the people are sovereign, all that matters is that citizens
contribute directly to the choices that guide their public life. Thus, there is no
reason to distinguish between "law," "administration," and "constitutional
constructions." In fact, the notion of an active sovereign is superior to that of
a potential sovereign from the neo-Aristotelean point of view because
eudaimonia is a way of life rather than something that is achieved and
completed. To the extent that eudaimonia depends upon political
engagement, political engagement should never cease. The decision-maker
should never lapse into being a "potential" sovereign. Moreover, since
political choices, like all others, depend upon changeable circumstances, they
ought to be viewed as provisional, subject always to further deliberation and
revision. Thus, questions of basic public importance should not be regarded
For a discussion of gaps in fundamental law created by failures of agreement in
expressions of will by the popular sovereign, see WHITTINGTON, supra note 205, at 157-59.
Gaps cannot be filled by an active sovereign will because the sovereign will does not exist
between its authoritative expressions embodied in constitutional texts. Id. at 157. Therefore,
"constitutional constructions" do not rest on the consent of the governed, but on "something
outside the sovereign will." Id. at 158. As a result, "[C]onstructions cannot claim a legally
binding force," but are no more than a policy that remains consistent until altered by the
sovereign's agents. Id. at 158.
235
The number and size of constitutional gaps, and therefore the scope of
opportunity for public deliberation, depend upon the strictness of originalist interpretation. As
Whittington elsewhere suggests, the strictest form of originalism will lead to the result that
much, if not most, legislation will be upheld, on the ground that no original intent is now
recoverable, or ever existed with respect to the specific question at issue. However, as this is a
contingent aspect of originalism, it plays no role in Whittington's argument.
236
Id. at 158-59.
234
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as "final."237
This view contrasts sharply with Whittington's assertion that
democratic dualism is valuable because it "limit[s] the times in which society
places heightened demands on citizenship."238 According to Whittington,
The people cannot be constantly assembled; public virtue
cannot always be kept at a fevered pitch. . . . [T]he
heightened degree of virtue wished for by [Rousseau and
Montesquieu] that would create an identity between self and
polity and replace self-interest with an other-regardingethos
is unrealistic.2 39
This reveals an underlying difference between Whittington and Aristotle on
the question of what political virtue entails. For Aristotle, political virtue is
simply an instance of virtue generally, which requires deliberation to
determine how to act under a specific set of circumstances. The only
distinctive features of political, as opposed to private, virtue are that it
involves questions of public concern and results in legally binding general
rules of conduct. There is nothing in it requiring a "fevered pitch" of
engagement, the identification "between self and polity," or the replacement
of "self-interest with an other-regarding ethos." From the Aristotelean point
of view, taking a rest from forming and revising political views would be as
odd as doing so with respect to matters of personal ethics.
To a large extent, democratic dualism is the descriptive device
adopted by Whittington to provide a theoretical underpinning to the form of
constitutional government we have. It explains the continuing authority of
the Constitution in terms of a "regulative ideal" that preserves selfgovernment. Whittington's main point is that this regulative ideal requires an
originalist form of judicial review. 240 A larger question is whether
Whittington's argument provides any independent basis for choosing
democratic dualism as a constitutional form. In other words, given a
generalized preference for democracy, is there any reason to suppose that
democratic dualism preserves or embodies self-government better than
legislative supremacy? If one were designing a democratic political system
from the ground up, rather than providing a best explanation for one that
exists, would Whittington offer a reason to prefer separating the sovereign
will from responsible government, in the form of a written constitution
placing judicially enforced limits on the exercise of power by an elected
government?
237 Whittington identifies finality as one of the virtues of constitutionalism, and
one that distinguishes consensually authorized "law" from "mere administration." With
respect to constitutionally entrenched language, Whittington asserts that "[t]here is no sense in
which the minority could say, 'You won this vote and got your constitution; but we'll be back
tomorrow and we'll see who wins then.' The commitment is not to a continuing decision
procedure. Each constitutional decision is regarded as final . . . ."Id. at 146.
238
WHITTINGTON, supra note 205, at 137
239
Id. (emphasis added).
240
Id. at 154.
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According to Whittington, democratic dualism provides a way
(through the assistance of originalism) to subject the exercise of government
power to genuine consent. The "achievement" of democratic dualism is to
distinguish between the constitutional and ministerial elements of politics.
For "[t]he continuing threat to self-government is the tendency to reunite
these elements in the hands of the governing officers." 24 1 But Whittington
does not deny that the legislature is responsive to the potentially sovereign
people when fulfilling its administrative functions. In fact, he states that
"there is every reason to think that the government is highly responsive to the
electorate."242 Then why should we fear that elected officials will become
"usurpers . . . assert[ing] their own authority to determine the public
good"? 24 3 In other words, why is the tendency to unite sovereignty and
administrative power in the government a threat to self-government, if
responsible government is actually responsible to those who elect it?
Whittington has two arguments in response to this question. First, he
argues that legislative bodies are too "unfocused" to contemplate questions
of fundamental public value successfully. In part, this is because "[i]n
supporting a particular candidate for office, few voters deliberate on
constitutional issues, for the good reason that the Constitution is not directly
implicated in normal political elections." Moreover, "political officials are
faced with myriad concerns related to the daily operation of the
government." 2 4 5 Hence, they are not disposed to approach issues with the
sort of deliberative detachment that high politics requires.
The response to Whittington's first argument is obviously that voters
would deliberate on constitutional questions if such questions were directly
implicated in normal political elections. This follows from the fact that
voters do routinely focus upon such questions through the faculty of sunesis.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 131. There is some indication that Whittington would locate his
justification of partial sovereignty precisely in the fact that the non-constitutionally authorized
acts of government to fill constitutional gaps are uniquely suited to represent the majority.
This may be inferred from his assertion that "the political nature of the task [of constitutional
construction) [indicates] the inappropriateness of its pursuit by the judiciary with its limited
access to external sources of authority." Id. at 158. In other words, only the legislature is
sufficiently attuned to respond to the circumstances of political reality, including the climate
of public opinion. This inference is reinforced by Whittington's discussion of how broadly to
draw the principles contained in the clauses of the constitutional text. See WHITrINGTON,
supra note 205, at 36-37. The more broadly they are drawn, the greater will be the scope for
judicial interpretation. However, Whittington draws the line in favor of legislative gap-filling.
He asserts that a high level of generality in interpretation "is excluded by a focus on the
meaning of specific clauses rather than on the animating principle that resulted in those more
specific clauses being drafted and ratified." Id. at 37. This focus on surface language
(understood through the recoverable intentions that inform that language) rather than
underlying principle greatly limits the potential for judicial intervention on the basis of
deductive or analogical reasoning.
243
Id. at 154.
244
Id. at 131.
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Moreover, there is no evidence that legislatures cannot simultaneously
address matters of administrative detail at close range and engage in the sort
of deliberation that provisional settlement of fundamental matters requires. It
is difficult to imagine how legislatures could avoid such deliberation. The
flood of state statutes refining the definition of marriage is only an obvious
recent example of such deliberation. If legislatures could not deliberate on
fundamental questions, then they would not be able to create the
constitutional constructions necessary to fill constitutional gaps. Thus, it
seems that Whittington's own theory requires legislatures to deliberate
successfully on fundamental questions that the sovereign has not addressed.
Whittington's second argument is more important. He describes the
sovereign's agent-government as a "partial sovereign" when it acts to adopt
constitutional constructions because it does not fully represent the whole of
the sovereign will. 24 6 "The views of the minority are not fully represented in
the construction . . . .
In contrast, the process of drafting and ratifying
constitutional text necessarily does embody the whole sovereign will. In part,
Whittington holds this view because he believes that the process of adopting
a constitution actually encourages "genuine efforts at conversion and
reconciliation," and minimizes the temptation to codify immediate selfinterest. 24 8 But this tendency would not ensure the kind of unanimity of
consent that allegedly separates sovereign consent from acquiescence in
mere constitutional constructions. Far more important, Whittington accepts
the idea, taken presumably from Montesquieu and Rousseau, that unity of
will is somehow built into the concept of sovereignty. But unlike
Montesquieu and Rousseau, Whittington believes that the sovereign will is
present only in the grave circumstance of constitution-making and not in the
continuous process of legislation. At the moment of constitution-making,
"the popular sovereign gains substance for us" 249 as "a regulative ideal." We
"are drawn into the sovereign" through our engagement with
constitutionalism.250 What is more, unity of will animates potential, as well
as active, sovereignty. "By accepting the authoritativeness of the
Constitution, we accept our right to devise a new constitution, and
incidentally become authors of the old."25'
The problem with these claims about the unity of will, even if taken
at face value, is that they have no independent appeal from the neoAristotelean perspective. In particular, Whittington does not indicate how the
formation of sovereign will differs from simple deliberation, which engages
members of both the majority and minority in the decision-making process.
Without more, there is nothing to deflect neo-Aristotelean political theory
246
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Id. at 157-59.
WHITrTINGTON, supra note 205, at 158.
Id. at 147; see also id. at 140-41, 145-49.
Id. at 143.
See id.

Id. at 144.
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from the central question of how, and to what extent, a constitution engages
current citizens in deliberation and solution of specific political questions
that require an answer here and now.
Another, more general problem with Whittington's theory is that
constitutional gap-filling seems to involve all the attributes of sovereignty.
Whittington would argue that constitutional constructions are effected under
delimited authority delegated through the sovereign people's consent and
subsequent acquiescence. However, it is difficult to understand how the
government acting in this capacity is anything less than fully sovereign, since
it then operates with full, unhindered power. That is, within its authorized
jurisdiction, there is nothing in Whittington's theory to prevent the
government from adopting whichever policy it prefers, subject to democratic
ratification. It exercises an unhindered power to decide, with the result that
sovereignty has been transferred, at least under the "positivist" definition
Whittington recognizes as still essential to the concept of sovereignty. In
short, there really is no space, between the authorized and unauthorized
exercise of power, for a semi-authorized form of power. Therefore, to
preserve his theory, Whittington ought to assert that when authority runs out,
the sovereign will must be consulted through the device of constitutiondrafting or amendment. The preservation of popular sovereignty demands
nothing less. Whittington's concept of partial sovereignty recognizes the
impracticality of this demand, but in accepting the authority of acts taken by
a fully sovereign legislature it renders unintelligible the distinction between
"law" and "mere administration."
Finally, Whittington's argument depends upon the realistic
possibility of effective action by the sovereign people. However, we have
seen that the barriers to amendment are so high that any further amendment
of the existing Constitution has been described as "next to impossible." 252 if
the possibility of amendment is nil, then it is hard to see how Whittington
can theorize the existence of meaningful consent in the people's continuing
acquiescence.
From the perspective of the neo-Aristotelean theory of political
virtue, Whittington offers no compelling reason to desire either a written
constitution or strong judicial review as the guarantor of self-government.
The joint concepts of "potential sovereignty" and "democratic dualism" do
nothing to enhance the opportunity for meaningful political decision-making
on a continuing basis. In fact, they constrain political deliberation, for the
faithful, originalist interpretation of the Constitution substitutes the judgment
of a prior generation, if not of a sitting court, for that of the community who
currently comprise the citizenry. Moreover, the concept of "constitutional
construction," which is the only attractive feature of Whittington's theory of
democratic governance, is arguably unsustainable within that theory, for it
effects the very transfer of sovereignty the theory is designed to avoid.
252

LEVINSON, supra note 171, at 21.
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Therefore Whittington's argument, like Peretti's argument from pluralist
democracy, ultimately reveals the incompatibility of judicial review with the
neo-Aristotelean theory of political virtue, which, as I have argued, implies
consensual self-government. 2 Moreover, if democracy also implies
consensual self-government, and self-government is incompatible with
judicial review, then democracy is also incompatible with judicial review,
which implies the failure of both Peretti and Whittington's argument.
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See supra Part II.

